Case summaries
In a decision on whether the return of an unaccompanied minor to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation is unlawful in light of Art. 3 ECHR and therefore the sovereignty clause should be used, Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU – best interest of the child as a primary consideration for authorities) is significant.
Political persecution can also exist when legally adopted criminal sanctions are imposed following standard legal proceedings against someone who has simply expressed political opinions. On the other hand, repressive measures with criminal sanctions against incitement to violence cannot be considered to be persecution.
This case concerned risk upon return to Iran in a situation where a person has previously been detained and tortured there and had supporting medical evidence. The Court found a violation of Art. 3 ECHR if the Applicant were to be deported to Iran.
In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).
Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.
The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.
This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.