Case summaries

Swiss deportation to Sudan of non-high-profile political opponent of Sudanese government would risk inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.

The interest of an applicant to obtain a temporary stay from deportation to Italy for the time being predominates, if the applicant, in case of his return back to Italy, would be threatened with serious damage to his health due to inadequate accommodation opportunities there and because medical care would not be guaranteed due to a permanent overstretch of resources.

The French authorities’ failure to conduct an adequate inquiry into the Applicant’s medical evidence resulted their dismissal of the credibility of the Tamil applicant, who, according to the ECtHR, would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Sri Lanka.

Rather than dismissing the application, the Court recognised the subsidiary protection status of the Applicant, as his/her return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (inhuman, degrading treatment or indiscriminate violence).

“The applicant bears the burden of the argument against the administrative authority, hereinafter referred to as the burden of proof. It is not, however, the duty of the asylum applicant to demonstrate his persecution by means other than his own credible testimony.”

“Where the testimony of an applicant for international protection submitted during proceedings can be identified as consistent and in accordance with the information available on the country of origin, in spite of minor inconsistencies, then such testimony must be relied on.”

When rejecting an application for international protection under the safe third country concept, Article 27 (2) (a) of the Procedures Directive needs to be taken into account. According to this article, the "connection" between the Applicant and the safe third country needs to be ascertained during the process. 

It is an administrative appeal brought before the High National Court against the Deputy Secretary of the Interior’s decision to dismiss the request to review the ruling which denied the claimant’s right to asylum.

The application for asylum was based on grounds of persecution as a result of the Applicant’s sexual orientation as a Cameroonian national.The application was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior as it was deemed that the claimant’s narrative did not portray personal persecution.

The High National Court reviewed the appeal and ruled that the State had not provided sufficient grounds to reject the validity and effectiveness of the documentation submitted by the Applicant.Therefore, the appeal was upheld and the claimant’s refugee status was recognised.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.