Case summaries

Article 17 forms an integral part of the Dublin Regulation and should be applied in a manner which furthers the aims and objectives of the Regulation in general. Article 17 is a justiciable right and should be particularly relied upon in circumstances where one of the overarching values of the Dublin Regulation, namely expedition, is not being fulfilled in the procedures of the host Member State. Article 17 is not subject to a prior assessment of non-satisfaction of Article 8 (family reunification) of that same Regulation.

Applicants who engaged with Dublin authorities should be subjected to less onerous standards when assessing the success of an Article 8 ECHR claim.

The UK Upper Tribunal held that there had been a failure of the Secretary of State to lawfully exercise the discretion conferred by Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation and ordered the Secretary of State to admit the applicant to the UK, based on: (1) the deficiencies of the Italian asylum system in the present case, namely the lack of sufficient expedition to register the asylum application and initiate Dublin proceedings; (2) the deficiencies and delay in the guardianship system in Italy; (3) the expected lengthy procedures for a “take charge” request and subsequent Dublin transfer; (4) the need to take into account the best interests of children.

Both applicants seek legal assistance and to register their application for asylum, which was previously refused by the Alpes Maritimes Prefect. The interim relief judge decided that the Prefect’s refusal to provide the individuals with an application form to register their application for asylum, notwithstanding their presence within the territory and contact with the police, amounted to a serious breach of the right to asylum.  

Article 10 of Dublin III is inapplicable; Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the regulation provide for three different procedural situations, the applicant’s claim could lead to a separation of the family. 

Request to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the following issues: Procedural delay, jurisdiction and living conditions under the Dublin Regulation. 

Objective criteria to define a ‘risk of absconding’ must be established in a binding provision of general application. In the absence of that, Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is inapplicable and detention on this ground must be declared unlawful. The existence of case-law confirming a consistent administrative practice by domestic law-enforcement authorities does not suffice to conform to Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation.

It was unlawful to detain an unaccompanied asylum seeking child, even in the reasonable belief that he was an adult.

Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.

If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.

It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.

Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.

In its decision, the tribunal defined the concept of ‘written’ according to the Dublin III Regulation. It also found that the a couple who were engaged did not constitute a family (according to the Regulation) unless they got engaged in their country of origin. Finally, the tribunal found that the sovereignty clause only afforded power to the State which was exercising it under the supervision of the administrative judge. 

Wishing to challenge his transfer to Germany from Luxembourg, the applicant appealed this decision and the court found that, on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, all individuals had a right to contest the manner in which the Dublin III criteria are applied. 

Switzerland is not the responsible Member State pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of the Dublin III Regulation, since the unaccompanied minor lives in a foster family in the Netherlands and the Dutch authorities should take into consideration the factors of Article 6 (3) Dublin III Regulation, including the views of the minor. According to the court, Nidos (the guardianship institution for unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands) is an expert institution and its advice should be followed in assessing the best interest of the child.