Case summaries

A failure to apply the Sovereignty Clause in Article 3.2 of Regulation (EC) 343/03 is unlawful when the applicant is in a seriously compromised state of health.

The Constitutional Court did not unreservedly uphold the judgment of the  Supreme Court. The Appellant in the case sought protection of his rights under Article 3 of the ECHR (and fundamental rights under Article 16(2) of the Constitution), which, in comparison with the other human rights and fundamental freedoms defined in the Convention, is characterised by an absolute and collective guarantee. In view of this, the Constitutional Court found that the standards of protection arising from Article 3 of the Convention (and Article 16(2) of the Constitution) should have been applied in the proceedings, even if such an obligation is not explicitly set out in the legislation, because these secure a greater range of constitutional rights and freedoms within the meaning of Article 154c(1) of the Constitution, and therefore take precedence over the law.

With this judgment, the General Assembly of CALL is trying to bring its case law in line with the M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR.

The CALL set the conditions under which an appeal for suspension against an enforceable decision (an order to leave the territory) has automatic suspensive effect.

After a prima facie examination (in extreme urgency), the CALL decided that the applicant in this casehas a reasonable ground of appeal on the basis of Article 3 of the ECHR, as he gave sufficient indications of the concrete problems he was experiencing in Poland. The CALL derived from this a duty of investigation on the part of the Aliens Office. This was sufficient for the CALL, furthermore, to provisionally suspend enforcement of an agreement with Poland to take back the applicant, pending the processing of an appeal for revocation.

European Directive 115/2008 (the ‘Return Directive’) should be applied to the detention of asylum seekers – that is, with all the restrictions on the detention system, which is not to be used automatically but only in cases where there is considered to be a risk of absconding or a threat to society, and with an obligation to state the reasons for the detention – because otherwise there could be an unjustifiable disparity in the treatment of those who are to be returned (and who do not necessarily have to be detained) and asylum seekers who are already destined for return or expulsion (who should always be detained).

In the opinion of the appeal court, the fact that the defendant disregarded the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his request for an application of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, and omitted to present an argument in the decision as to why it had not upheld the application, fails to satisfy the requirements of the generally accepted legal principles of administrative procedure, because the outcomes of these actions were not assessed and justified in the decision.

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an asylum applicant to Poland. The Council of State rejected the applicant’s claim that he was not informed about the Dublin procedure in a language intelligible to him, as the applicant had indicated he understood Russian and an interpreter had been provided. Moreover, the circumstances necessary to apply Art 3(2) Dublin Regulation had not been met.

A transfer to Greece within the framework of the Dublin Regulation was stopped due to the conditions for asylum seekers in the country.

The failure of an asylum applicant to appear with her children (systematically or repeatedly) when summoned in relation to a transfer order under the Dublin Regulation is considered as absconding and results in the extension of the transfer deadline to 18 months. In this case, the applicant never appeared with her children despite receiving several notifications and, according to the Council of State, she was aware that the presence of her children was crucial in order to proceed with her transfer.

After the applicant absconded the time frame for a deportation was extended by 18 months and, therefore, Poland’s original acceptance was still valid at the time of the second application. Art 7 Dublin II Regulation is not applicable because the applicant’s family life was established after his first application for asylum. There is no violation of Art 8 ECHR because the applicant’s family life was formed at a moment when the applicant did not know whether he would be able to maintain it.

The French authorities shall use the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation, under the judge’s supervision, when the rules that determine responsibility of a member state for the asylum procedure may infringe on international and national rights guaranteed to refugees and applicants for asylum. In this case a transfer order to Hungary, where the applicant had on two occasions been detained in unsuitable conditions, was held to be an unlawful infringement of the applicant’s right to asylum.