Case summaries

The Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF) appealed against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Sintra, which had upheld the application for annulment of the order of the National Director of SEF - holding that the application for asylum made by the defendant was inadmissible and held that Italy was the State responsible for taking back the applicant - and had ordered SEF to admit, process and assess the applicant's claim, with a final decision.

The Central Administrative Court of the South dismissed the appeal, confirming the contested decision on the ground of a real and proven risk of the applicant suffering cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment.

The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) must carry out an individualised examination to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum procedure of the Member State where the applicant shall be transferred to has systemic weaknesses that would entail a risk of inhuman treatment or chain deportation.

The transfer of a family to the previous country of entry (Bulgaria), which might entail the risk of refoulement to the country of origin (Afghanistan), would cause an irreversible and serious harm; it ordered the suspension of the transfer decision until the final decision, on the annulment of the rejection of the application on the refugee status, was issued.

The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.

The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9.  To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.

The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.

Neither Austrian law nor the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation provide for legal remedies against a Member State’s rejection of a request for admission. The Dublin Regulation provides for a remonstration procedure between the Member States concerned in the event of a rejection, whereby after expiry of the remonstration period the requesting Member State is finally responsible for examining the application for international protection. A later agreement after the remonstration period has expired cannot establish any responsibility.

The discretionary clause in Art. 17 II Dublin-III regulation might under certain circumstances oblige the member states to take charge of an applicant. This can be particularly the case, if the competence of the member state under chapter III of the Dublin-III regulation would not be given because of a deadline expiry the applicant had no influence on.

The notification about the intention of withdrawal from the EU by the Member-State responsible for the examination of the application for international protection does not trigger the determining Member-State’s obligation to make use of the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) 604/2013 EU. Similarly, Article 6 (1) cannot be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the Member State that is not responsible to take into account the best interests of the child and to examine the application itself under 17 (1)

The extension of the transfer period in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2 sentence 2 Dublin Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation) requires that the asylum applicant absconds, which has to be proven by the transferring authority.

Absconding is only the case, if the asylum applicant cannot be reached by the competent authorities for an (undefined) longer period of time. The intention to evade the authorities does not have to be proven. The circumstances of the individual case are decisive.

Article 8 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides for a subjective right to family reunification, both for the applicant himself and for the family members present in the Member State responsible. This right is also justiciable to the extent that denial of transfer affects the rights to family unity and the best interest of an unaccompanied minor.

The expiry of the time limit for the submission of a take charge request pursuant to Article 21 (1) of the Dublin III Regulation, as well as for the submission of a request to review the rejection of a take charge request (so-called "remonstration") pursuant to Article 5 (2) of the Implementing Regulation to the Dublin II Regulation, does not reverse the responsibility back to the requesting Member State if the failure to comply with the time limit cannot be attributed to the applicant and family unity and the best interests of the child take precedence over the procedural rules on time limits.

Due to the paramount importance of the right to family unit and the best interests of the child, the discretion under Article 17(2) of the Dublin III Regulation translates into a legal obligation of the Member State to invoke the sovereignty clause where there are close family ties. Beyond such family ties, no further special relationship or interdependency is required.

Whether a minor is "unaccompanied" within the meaning of Article 2 lit. j of the Dublin III Regulation depends on the domestic law in the Member State where the minor is present.