Case summaries

Asylum authority’s decision regarding the application of the safe third country principle quashed. The Court pointed out that the application of the STC principle is ‘absolutely unacceptable.’

The Court found that the new DL 34/2008 in no way affects the legal regime established by the previous Law 27/2008, which secures the right to a legal procedure free of judicial costs in asylum claims. The Law 27/2008, altered by the new Law 26/2014, does not establish a cost exemption, which, if it did, would be then regulated by the DL 34/2008.

Based on the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU ruled that a limit of 15 days to apply for subsidiary protection following a notification of the decision not to grant refugee status is particularly short and cannot be justified by the need to ensure an effective return procedure. The limited period endangers applicants’ ability to submit an application for subsidiary protection.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) because it failed to carry out a proper establishment of facts as required by the Dublin III Regulation.

This case concerned the detention of four applicants from Ghana in Italy. The basis of the claim was a violation of Article 5(1) ECHR.

Asserting a violation of the procedural rules by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (‘OFPRA’) when a child’s legal representative or any ad hoc administrator was absent from a hearing, the National Court of Asylum (‘CNDA’) annulled OFPRA’s decision and sent the case back to it to be decided again under the correct circumstances.

The CNDA sets out the limits to the principle of family unity in such as it is not applicable to the child of a refugee, the refugee having obtained that status only through application of the said principle following her marriage with a refugee not being the father of the child.

The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.

Asylum seekers cannot be rejected at the border crossing without having the possibility to state reasons for obtaining international protection as well as a precise indication of reasons for the refusal of entry on the entry form. An assessment of the submitted reasons for asylum cannot only depend on an assessment by an interpreter, but must be decided through the responsible authority or court.

In order to protect the security of state and public order, it is justifiable to limit freedoms and rights, including the right to court. The right to court covers the possibility to access case files by the party of the proceedings as well as the possibility to get to know the motives of the decision and formulate allegations against them. When there is a need to protect the security of state and public order, the rights of the party of the proceedings are limited. The party cannot get to know the motives of the decisions and has to rely on the fair judgement of the authority.

The courts as well as the administrative authorities got to know the motives of the decision and had a possibility to verify them in the context of the legal conditions in return proceedings. Their assessment is binding and sufficient. Assessment of the authorities is subject to control of legality in administrative court proceedings, so it cannot be stated that the actions of the authority are out of control.

The Supreme Administrative Court rules that Article 12(1)2 of the Return Directive which allows for non-disclosure of certain facts of the return decision for the reasons of national security is a specific law applicable in return cases and to that extent it excludes the general safeguards envisaged in Article 47 of the Charter.

The issue to be decided in this case was whether the applicant was entitled to judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Applications Commissioners, or whether her complaints could be adequately addressed on appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.