Case summaries

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
 

The right to have recourse to the courts as enshrined in the German constitution (Art. 19 ss. 4 GG) is to be assessed in a thorough and reliable manner if the right to physical integrity (Art. 2 ss. 2 GG and Art. 3 of the ECHR) is at stake. The courts only adhere to this obligation if they carefully assess the evidence brought to them by the applicant considering the specific context of a person who has been granted international protection in a third country. 

The applicant, an ethnic Ingush and a Muslim from Ingushetia, Russia, feared her former husband and his family. She feared they would take her daughter away from her because she ran away with her child. Moreover, the applicant feared her eldest brother as he would marry her off to an elderly man and take her child away and hand the child over to her former husband.

The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the conflicts between the applicant and her family members were of such nature and intensity to fall under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7. Consequently, the Board upheld the Danish Immigration Service’s decision to refuse the application.

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.

The applicant, an ethnic Al-Bagal and Sunni Muslim from Moraya, Nyala, Darfur, Sudan feared imprisonment or execution by the Sudanese authorities. According to the applicant’s account he had been imprisoned for alleged political activities for a total of 18 months during which he was tortured. Subsequently, he was regularly harassed by the Intelligence Service.

The Danish Immigration Service rejected the asylum application in July 2016.

On 29 November 2016, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision of the Danish Immigration Service. The majority of the Board did not find to a sufficient degree that a torture examination would be of essential importance for deciding the case.

The Refugee Appeals Board resumed the case based on a forensic report presented by the applicant. The Board now referring to the forensic report accepted that the applicant had been exposed to torture. The Board thus found that the applicant, to a sufficient degree, had rendered probable that he, if returning to Sudan, was at risk of persecution and granted the applicant refugee status according to the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

The applicant, an ethnic Kurd and a Yarsan from Kanehar, Kermanshah, Iran, had performed religious activities aimed at spreading the knowledge of the faith and thereby attracted the attention of the authorities.

The majority of the Board accepted the applicants account and consequently the Board found that the applicant risked persecution because of his Yarsan religious activities and granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

The Immigration Rules (“the Rules”) minimum income requirements (“the MIR”) for individuals who have a right to live in the UK who wish to bring their non-EEA citizen spouses to live with them are not open to legal challenge. 

The Rules fail unlawfully to give effect to the duty of the Secretary of State (“the SoS”) in respect of the welfare of children under s.55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”), however the challenge to the validity of the Rules was dismissed.

To ensure that their decisions are compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”) however, revisions to instructions for entry clearance officers (“the Instructions”) are necessary.

The applicant, a stateless Palestinian and a Sunni Muslim from Baghdad, had been threatened by a Shia Militia working with or for the Ministry of Interior.

Based on the coherent, logical and consistent account in accordance with the current country of origin information the Board found the applicant exposed to persecution by the authorities or persecution supported by the authorities.

The applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

A Stateless Palestinian and Sunni Muslim from Lebanon, single woman, born and raised in Saudi Arabia who had a conflict with her family because she had had a relationship with a French Christian man and lost her virginity.

The Board found that seen in isolation as a Stateless Palestinian the applicant is covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art 7 (1).

The Board found that because the applicant had never resided in Lebanon, did not have any relation to that country, and due to her conflict with her family and based on country of origin information regarding entry options to Saudi Arabia as well as Lebanon for Stateless Palestinians, neither Saudi Arabia nor Lebanon could be considered as a first country of asylum. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).