Case summaries

The competent authority has to respect as legally binding a court order that determines a certain date of birth and thereby the minority of an applicant. This is also the case if the applicant himself indicates another (earlier) date of birth.

The personal interview of a minor without his legal representative constitutes a significant procedural violation. The facts are presumed to not be ascertained. The competent authority has to ascertain the facts and circumstances once again. 

An asylum applicant who was a victim of previous persecution in their country of origin can be granted refugee status under article 1, C 5) of the Geneva Convention. This is because, due to the severity of the treatment applied, the applicant’s fear is exacerbated to such an extent that, even if the persecution has ceased to exist, a return to the country of origin would be unthinkable. 

In case of reasonable doubt, the statement of the applicant for asylum about his or her date of birth has to be viewed as a credible statement.

Following the appeal of the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the order of the Regional Administrative Court, in relation to a challenge to the decision of the Polish Refugee Board, and set aside the aforementioned decision to refuse tolerated stay, dismissing the appeal in all other respects.

The court justified its decision with reference to the procedural errors of the Polish Refugee Board, which included failing to gather evidence in an appropriate manner and inappropriately establishing the facts relating to the Applicant’s children. 

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.
 

The right to have recourse to the courts as enshrined in the German constitution (Art. 19 ss. 4 GG) is to be assessed in a thorough and reliable manner if the right to physical integrity (Art. 2 ss. 2 GG and Art. 3 of the ECHR) is at stake. The courts only adhere to this obligation if they carefully assess the evidence brought to them by the applicant considering the specific context of a person who has been granted international protection in a third country. 

The applicant, an ethnic Ingush and a Muslim from Ingushetia, Russia, feared her former husband and his family. She feared they would take her daughter away from her because she ran away with her child. Moreover, the applicant feared her eldest brother as he would marry her off to an elderly man and take her child away and hand the child over to her former husband.

The Refugee Appeals Board did not find that the conflicts between the applicant and her family members were of such nature and intensity to fall under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7. Consequently, the Board upheld the Danish Immigration Service’s decision to refuse the application.

Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an absolute obligation on contracting States not to deport an asylum seeker where doing so would expose him or her to a genuine and serious risk of violence. Under the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, this remains the case where the application does not fall within the immediate responsibilities of that State.

The applicant, an ethnic Al-Bagal and Sunni Muslim from Moraya, Nyala, Darfur, Sudan feared imprisonment or execution by the Sudanese authorities. According to the applicant’s account he had been imprisoned for alleged political activities for a total of 18 months during which he was tortured. Subsequently, he was regularly harassed by the Intelligence Service.

The Danish Immigration Service rejected the asylum application in July 2016.

On 29 November 2016, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision of the Danish Immigration Service. The majority of the Board did not find to a sufficient degree that a torture examination would be of essential importance for deciding the case.

The Refugee Appeals Board resumed the case based on a forensic report presented by the applicant. The Board now referring to the forensic report accepted that the applicant had been exposed to torture. The Board thus found that the applicant, to a sufficient degree, had rendered probable that he, if returning to Sudan, was at risk of persecution and granted the applicant refugee status according to the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).