Case summaries
The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State denying the Claimants a right of in-country appeal against the removal of the Claimants to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Claimants argued that their removal to Italy would expose them to a real risk of a breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The court found that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU laws or of special vulnerability in the personal circumstances of any of the Claimants, to support the assertion that Article 3 of the ECHR would be breached by the Claimants’ removal to Italy.
The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.
The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.
Although the decision and length of Greek detention of asylum seekers was justified and proportionate, the conditions of the Venna detention centre did not comply with Article 3 and there was no effective review of the lawfulness of their detention.
The return of a Pakistani national of the Ahmadiyya religion to Pakistan would violate Article 3. The French authorities had wrongly rejected the Ahmadiyya Applicant’s credibility, which is supported by evidence of prosecution by the Pakistani authorities for blasphemy.
A determination must disclose clearly the reasons for a tribunal's decision. If a tribunal finds oral evidence to be implausible, incredible or unreliable or a document to be worth no weight whatsoever, it is necessary to say so in the determination and for such findings to be supported by reasons. A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons.
It is impossible to advise the Applicant to request the protection of public bodies in a situation in which the public bodies obviously discriminate against a certain religious group. When examining the alternative option of internal relocation, it is necessary to assess the legal and factual availability in terms of the circumstances of the Applicant. It is impossible to build the protection proceedings on a testimony with partial inaccuracies and to revert to translated reports provided by the Applicant.
Ahmadis, for whom the practise and possibly also the promotion of their faith in public are elements which define their identity and as such are essential, are very likely to be at risk of political persecution in Pakistan. The “relationship consideration” demanded by the Federal Administrative Court, whereby the number of members of a particular group is compared with the number of actual threatening acts of persecution, seems virtually impossible in this case.
It is an administrative appeal brought before the High National Court against the Ministry of the Interior’s decision to deny an examination of the application for international protection by a claimant of Pakistani nationality, on the basis that Germany is responsible for the examination in accord with EU Regulation 343/2003 of 18th February (Dublin Regulation).
The High National Court had not yet evaluated the basis of the application for international protection because, before doing so, an obstacle to the proceedings arose:this concerned the determination of the country responsible for examining the application and, in particular, the breach of the legal time period for the transfer of this responsibility (a maximum period of 6 months for the transfer).
The concept of a serious violation of religious freedom according to Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) does not simply refer to a serious encroachment on the freedom to practice one’s faith in private but also the freedom to practice religion in a public context.
The enforced renunciation of religious activities can constitute persecution. Since persecution may lie in the prohibition itself, the actual future behaviour of the asylum-seeker and associated involvement in the other legal interests of the party concerned (e.g. life and freedom) are not relevant.
Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.