Case summaries

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

The Court found that a simple finding that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria because the population of the country is so large was devoid of any substantiation by reference to the facts of the case or to the circumstances of the applicant and of his family or to the nature of the threat of persecution which relocation would serve to avoid.

The Court indicated that that a finding that internal relocation will provide protection involves a two- fold consideration:

(a) First, the identification - if only in general terms - of an area or place in the country of origin which can reasonably be expected to be free of the particular source of persecution from which the applicant requires protection; and

(b) Secondly, an inquiry sufficient to confirm that a relocation there is feasible and reasonable to expect of the applicant (even if it involves hardship) having regard to the personal circumstances of the applicant and of his family.

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

This case concerned the refusal of a Refugee appeal on the basis that Sate protection was available and/or that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria and avoid persecution.  In support of the finding that State was available; the Tribunal Member relied upon part of a UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note (OGN) on Nigeria that had not been provided to the applicant. The Court found that the applicant not afforded fair procedures. She had no opportunity to comment upon the information in the OGN. The Court also found that the issue of whether or not State protection is available does not depend upon the existence of a police complaints procedure but upon a determination that there exists in the country of origin as a matter of current practice, an effective system for the detection, investigation, prosecution and conviction of crimes of the kind which form the subject matter of the complaint.

The Court obliged the Respondent to conduct new proceedings as it expressed an opinion on the Claimant’s state of health without appointing an expert.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4.3 of the Qualification Directive and the nature of the assessment of the facts and circumstances of a refugee application that should take place. The Court rejected the argument that a failure by a first instance decision-maker to consider each of the mandatory matters set out in Article 4.3 rendered that decision unlawful such that it must be quashed, rather than allowing for any such defect to be cured by an appeal body. The obligation imposed by the Directive is satisfied when any errors or misjudgements at the first instance stage, including deficiencies in complying with Article 4.3 are remedied by an appeal stage.

The applicant complained that the refusal to recommend refugee status at first instance contained errors such that on appeal the “core claim” was effectively being heard for the first time, and further the subsidiary protection assessment was not in compliance with statutory requirements which gave effect to the Qualification Directive; and that he should have had a chance to comment on country of origin information used in the assessment of his application.

The applicant claimed asylum on the grounds of having suffered female genital mutilation (FGM) and being subject to a forced marriage. The Ministry of Interior refused the application and the applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court who also rejected the appeal (the applicant was granted a residence permit for humanitarian reasons). The applicant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

In an application for subsidiary protection made after a failed refugee claim (and after a Deportation Order has been made), the Minister has a discretion to consider the application, which he can exercise if there is new information or altered circumstances. The absence of such means that that the Minister is entitled to refuse to entertain the application; there is no automatic right to make such an application at that late stage of proceedings.

This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.