Case summaries
The ECtHR found the detention of a homosexual asylum seeker in Hungary was arbitrary, in violation of Article 5(1) ECHR. In particular, the Court found that the Hungarian authorities had failed to make an individualised assessment and to take into account the applicant’s vulnerability in the detention facility based on his sexual orientation. The Court emphasised that the authorities should exercise special care when deciding on deprivation of liberty in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the plight that forced asylum seekers to flee in the first place.
The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively cooperate in drawing up the facts that support the claim of the applicant.
Dublin III is characterised by the introduction or re-fortification of rights and mechanisms which guarantee the involvement of the asylum seeker in the determination process. Article 27(1) when read in conjunction with Recital 19 is ,therefore, to be interpreted as allowing an asylum seeker to appeal a transfer decision on grounds that the Chapter III allocation criteria were incorrectly applied.
Any deprivation of liberty must fall within the exceptions set out in Art. 5 of the Convention, and must be lawful, namely in compliance with domestic law, and free from arbitrariness. For this latter purpose, domestic law must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application.
After a certain time of mere waiting for the detainee’s cooperation, detention ceases to be genuinely imposed for the purpose of detention, in accordance with art. 5.1(f) of the Convention.
If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.
In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants.
The judgment examined whether returns of asylum seekers to Bulgaria would be contrary to their Article 3 rights. The court held that the Bulgarian system has significantly improved since the UNHCR report in 2014 which prohibited returns of asylum seekers. As a result the returns would not be in breach of Article 3.
Detention of migrants for criminal offences subject to return is lawful even if asylum-seeker status is subsequently acquired. The application of 2008/115/EC is then not mandatory and the detention’s duration is not addressed under Article 5 (1)(f) therefore is to be judged ad hoc.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) submitted the following two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling according to Article 267 TFEU:
An Article 3 compliant assessment requires a full and ex nunc evaluation of a claim. Where the State is made aware of facts that could expose an applicant to an individual risk of ill-treatment, regardless of whether the applicant chooses to rely on such facts, it is obliged to assess this risk ex proprio motu.
When a Member State accepts a request by Germany to take charge of an applicant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (the “Dublin II Regulation”), the applicant may be transferred to that Member State even if he/she limits his/her application to subsidiary protection after the request to take charge has been accepted.