Case summaries
Partial quashing of the list of safe countries of origin: Armenia, Madagascar, Turkey and Mali (women only) removed from the list
An Armenian opposition politician was considered a political refugee by the Migration Court of Appeal. Both the Migration Board and the Migration Court believed the applicant's political commitment and account of events. The Board considered, however, that the Armenian authorities' actions were not unreasonable and dismissed the application.
The Migration Court stated the fact that the applicant was not imprisoned for long periods did not imply that the arrests and ill-treatment that took place could be considered as acceptable measures by the authorities. Nor could the actions of the authorities be considered as reasonable or acceptable. The applicant was considered to be the victim of persecution that was rooted in his political belief.
The accelerated procedure (in this case, applicants from a safe country of origin) guarantees the individual assessment of the applicant’s situation and their right to a remedy with suspensive effect.
The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.
Failure to receive basic services does not represent a reduction within the meaning of Art 16 Reception Conditions Directive. The Reception Conditions Directive does not standardise decision deadlines with regard to applications for the granting of basic services.
The sexual orientation of the Applicant for asylum may, depending on circumstances and with regard to the situation in the country of origin, be considered a sign of his membership of a particular social group. The threat of injury to the Applicant for asylum as a result of actions causing psychological pressure may not be as serious as injuries that result in threats to life or freedom, but must be at least of a comparable type.
The provisions regarding the establishment and operation of Refugee Centres do not constitute a basis for ordering foreigners to stay in the said Centres, under penalty of having the asylum application procedure halted, on the sole ground that the police authorities consider their applications for asylum to be manifestly unfounded. The Refugee Centres were not established as centres where foreigners would be obliged to live – under penalty of halting the process of examining their applications for leave to remain – until the process had been completed, if those foreigners wish to and are able to stay elsewhere during the procedure, unless the Administration states that the measure is necessary for a specific and fully justified reason of public interest.
When a transfer under the Dublin Regulation would result in a violation of fundamental rights, the Member State in which the applicant is present can examine the asylum application even though another State should have been responsible under the Dublin Regulation. In this case, the applicant’s wife was allowed to remain in France as she was in the advanced stage of pregnancy and, therefore, transferring the applicant would violate Art 8 ECHR.