Case summaries

For the assumption of reasonable internal flight alternatives, a case-by-case assessment must be made on the basis of sufficient findings about the expected situation of the asylum applicant in the country of origin. On the basis of general information on the situation in the country of origin, a young, healthy man with school education and professional experience and who is familiar with the local conditions, can in principle be expected to resettle in Kabul.

The Regional Administrative Court of Upper Austria requests a preliminary ruling of the CJEU concerning the interpretation of Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU in the context of social assistance for persons entitled to asylum with a temporary residence permit.

1) Must Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU, entitling persons subject to international protection to the same level of social assistance in the Member State as nationals of this Member State, be interpreted as fulfilling the conditions for direct effect as set out in the CJEU’s jurisprudence?

2) Must Article 29 Directive 2011/95/EU be interpreted in the way, that it opposes national legislation that provides for persons with a temporary residence permit the same level of social assistance as for persons falling under subsidiary protection, while persons with a permanent residence permit are allowed to the social assistance provided for nationals of the Member State concerned?

The Court held that where asylum applicants are prevented from obtaining necessary documentation that would allow them to be granted a license to marry, due to their severed ties with their countries of origin, a simple statutory declaration will suffice as proof that there are no legal obstacles preventing them from getting married.   

Sending countries are under the obligation not to transfer any individual to another country if any reasonable doubt regarding systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State arises. The mere assumption that the country will comply with its obligations under international and European law is not sufficient and the sending country is under the obligation to comply with the precautionary principle and not allow the transfer.

Kabul cannot be considered as a reasonable internal flight alternative for the complainant due to the lack of a sustainable social network for him there and no other particular factors which would enable the applicant's removal . Therefore the complainant does not meet the requirements for a removal to Afghanistan.

Effective access to justice relies on an individual having a voice in the proceedings concerning him or her. Solely focusing on the credibility of the appellant’s account and not having regard to objective evidence testifying to the appellant’s vulnerability or the risk to the appellant of return to Afghanistan has led to the proceedings being neither fair nor just. A material error of law has therefore been committed. 

A third-country national whose entry was tolerated by the authorities of one Member State faced with the arrival of an unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking transit through that Member State in order to lodge an application for international protection in another Member State, without fulfilling the entry conditions generally imposed in the first Member State, must be regarded as having ‘irregularly crossed’ the border of the first Member State within the meaning of that provision. Article 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation III therefore applies and Croatia is deemed to be responsible for the protection claims. 

1. Afghans who have worked for international aid organisations are particularly endangered of becoming victims of political persecution by non-state actors (e.g. Taliban) according to § 3 (1) AsylG in case of a return to Afghanistan.

2. There is no internal protection for these people. They cannot escape the clutches of non-state actors as these groups have a wide (information) network at their disposal and an increased interest in persons who have worked for international aid organisations.

The applicant, an ethnic Turkman and an atheist from Aache, Afghanistan had received death threats from local residents close to the imam as well as from his own father because of his apostasy.

The Refugee Appeals Board found that the applicant because of his apostacy would be at risk of being persecuted by local residents, Afghan authorities and the Taleban. Consequently, the applicant was granted refugee status under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1).

The Federal Supreme Court rules that the separate detention of families with minor children and the placement in a children’s home violates the right to family life in Art. 8 ECHR, if less intrusive measures than detention have not been taken into consideration.