National case summaries

The applicant, a victim of rape and forced marriage, has a subjective right to reception which allows her to live a life compatible with human dignity in light of her vulnerability and the minimum norms of reception. This right is entirely linked with FEDASIL’s competences to ensure reception is adapted to an individual’s circumstances. The statement of the asbl SOS VIOL clearly justifies why the applicant should be accommodated in a Local Reception Initiative, reception which is better adapted to the symptoms that she suffers from, notably anxiety and fear of men.The criticism of the asbl's statement whilist not providing any pschological assessment themselves, meant that FEDASIL’s decision not to transfer the applicant to adapted accommodation was negligent. 

The applicant is entitled to be transferred to individual accommodation and moral damages in the region of 2.500 euros.  

Usually it does not infringe the constitutional right of equality nor the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, when the residence permit of a disabled foreign national is restricted on grounds of a lack of independent secured livelihood pursuant to §§ 25 (5) 1, 12 (2) 2 German Residence Act.

The applicant had fled from Russia and sought international protection from Portuguese authorities.

The request was later denied by the Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service, after issuing a take charge request directed to Finland, the responsible State for the assessment of the applicant’s request according to the DRIII, based on her possession of a short stay visa in Finland.

When examining the acceptance of an asylum claim, the authorities have to study whether the testimony of the applicant is based on presumably true facts. Only if it is manifestly false could the admission of this application be denied.

The principle of family unity has to be taken into account regarding the assessment of the circumstances of the applicant, especially since his sister’s application for international protection was accepted.

The complainant is a Sunni Muslim from Mogadishu, Somalia. In July 2015 the Danish Immigration Service decided that his subsidiary protection status under the Danish Aliens Act. Art. 7 (2) had lapsed according to the Danish Aliens Act Art. 17 (1) and (4). The Refugee Appeals Board did not consider that the Danish Immigrations Service had lifted its burden of proof according to the Danish Aliens Act Art 17 (4). Consequently, the Board granted the complainant continued subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).  

The complainant is an ethnic Galadi and a Muslim from Afgoye, Somalia. On 6 April 2017, the Danish Immigration Service decided not to prolong the complainant’s subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 11 (2), cf. Art. 19 (1) no. 1 and Art. 19 (7) cf. Art. 26 (1).

After an overall assessment of the country of origin information the Board found that a deportation of the complainant to Afgoye no longer constitutes a violation of Denmark’s international obligations including ECHR article 3. However, regarding the assessment under the Aliens Act article 26, the Board found that due to the applicant’s economic, linguistic and social integration the Immigration Service’s decision to end the applicant’s subsidiary protection was incorrect. Thus the Board decided to uphold his subsidiary protection under the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2).

The Refugee Appeals Board reversed the Danish Immigration Service decision to Dublin Transfer a female asylum seeker and her two minor children to Italy. The Board found that a transfer to Italy could amount to a breach of Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as reception conditions in Italy are subject to certain shortcomings and the asylum seeker and her two minor children were considered to be extremely vulnerable. 

The National Court for the Right of Asylum (CNDA) has a responsibility to follow the general rules on closing files. Where this is not done, the Court can be found negligent.  

The court gave guidance on the application of a structured approach to credibility assessment.

The following questions are referred to the Court of Justice of the EU for a preliminary ruling:

(i) when dealing with transfer of a protection applicant under regulation 604/2013 to the UK, is a national decision-maker, in considering any issues arising in relation to the discretion under art. 17 and/or any issues of protection of fundamental rights in the UK, required to disregard circumstances as they stand at the time of such consideration in relation to the proposed withdrawal of the UK from the EU;

(ii) does the concept of the “determining member state” in regulation 614/2013 include the role of the member state in exercising the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iii) do the functions of a member state under art. 6 of regulation 604/2013 include the power recognised or conferred by art. 17 of the regulation;

(iv) does the concept of an effective remedy apply to a first instance decision under art. 17 of regulation 604/2013 such that an appeal or equivalent remedy must be made available against such a decision and/or such that national legislation providing for an appellate procedure against a first instance decision under the regulation should be construed as encompassing an appeal from a decision under art. 17;

(v) does art. 20(3) of regulation 604/2013 have the effect that in the absence of any evidence to displace a presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to treat his or her situation as indissociable from that of the parents, the national decision maker is not required to consider such best interests separately from the parents as a discrete issue or as a starting point for consideration of whether the transfer should be take place.