CJEU - Case C-528/15, Policie ČR,Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké policie v Salah Al Chodor, Ajlin Al Chodor, Ajvar Al Chodor
| Country of Domestic Proceedings: | Czech Republic |
| Country of applicant: | Iraq |
| Court name: | Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber) |
| Date of decision: | 15-03-2017 |
| Citation: | Case C-528/15 |
Keywords:
| Keywords |
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Detention
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Description
"Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority(ies) in order that another procedure may be implemented. In an EU asylum context, this means confinement of an asylum seeker by a Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement. This may occur during any stage of or throughout the asylum process, from the time an initial application is made up to the point of removal of an unsuccessful asylum seeker. In an EU Return context, Member States may only detain or keep in a detention facility a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when: (a) there is a risk of absconding; or (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process. Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence." |
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Freedom of movement (right to)
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Description
Generally: “This right is made up of three basic elements: freedom of movement within the territory of a country, right to leave any country and the right to return to his or her own country." In an EU context: "A fundamental right of every citizen of an EU Member State or another European Economic Area (EEA) State or Switzerland to freely move, reside and work within the territory of these States. Notes: 1. This is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2. Whilst initially one of the founding rights in the establishment of the European Union, it has also been extended, via various acquis and agreements (e.g. see Protocol 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), to other EEA states (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) plus Switzerland and certain categories of third-country nationals (as outlined in Notes 4. and 5. below). 3. Some Member States have applied transitional arrangements that currently restrict freedom of movement of workers/(citizens) of EU-2 Member States (see http://ec.europa.eu). 4. Whilst third-country nationals have the right to travel freely within the Schengen area, taking up residence in another Member State is covered by specific legal instruments, detailed below. 5. Third-country nationals may take up residence in another Member State depending on their status and subject to the necessary conditions being met. For third-country nationals who are long-term legal residents in an EU Member State, this is covered by Chapter III of Council Directive 2003/109/EC, whilst for third-country nationals with highly qualified employment, this is covered by Article 18 of Council Directive 2009/50/EC.” |
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Dublin Transfer
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Description
"The transfer of responsibility for the examination of an asylum application from one Member State to another Member State. Such a transfer typically also includes the physical transport of an asylum applicant to the Member State responsible in cases where the applicant is in another Member State and/or has lodged an application in this latter Member State (Article 19(3) of Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003). The determination of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application is done on the basis of objective and hierarchical criteria, as laid out in Chapter III of Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003." |
Headnote:
Objective criteria to define a ‘risk of absconding’ must be established in a binding provision of general application. In the absence of that, Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is inapplicable and detention on this ground must be declared unlawful. The existence of case-law confirming a consistent administrative practice by domestic law-enforcement authorities does not suffice to conform to Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation.
Facts:
The Al Chodors, who are Iraqi nationals of Kurdish origin, travelled via Turkey to Greece and, while in Hungary, were stopped and fingerprinted by the police. With the aim of joining family members in Germany, they continued their journey but were stopped by the Czech police and detained under Paragraph 129(1) of Czech Law No 326/1999, read in conjunction with Article 28(2) of the Dublin III, i.e. to secure transfer procedures under the ground of a “serious risk of absconding”.
The Czech police determined the existence of a ‘serious risk of absconding’ on the basis that the Al Chodors did not have a residence permit nor accommodation in the Czech Republic, had previously absconded and intended to travel to Germany.
The Al Chodors successfully appealed against the detention decision: a Czech Regional Court ruled the detention unlawful as the Czech legislation did not lay down the objective criteria for the assessment of a risk of absconding.
The Foreigners Police Section appealed on a point of law before the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that the provision conditioned the assessment of a “risk of absconding” to three aspects: the need for an individual assessment, the proportionality of the decision, and the impossibility of employing a less coercive measure. Therefore, the Supreme Administrative Court submitted the following question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling: does the sole fact that a law has not defined objective criteria for assessment of a significant risk of absconding render detention under Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation inapplicable?
Decision & reasoning:
First, the Court recalled that, despite having immediate effect in the national legal systems, some of the provisions of Regulations may necessitate the adoption of measures by national authorities for their implementation. In that sense, the definition of the criteria to assess a “risk of absconding” is a matter for national law.
Second, the Court had to determine if the word “law” in Article 2(n) (which requires the criteria to assessing a risk of absconding to be “defined by law”) can be understood as including settled case-law which confirms a consistent administrative practice. The CJEU noted that the Dublin III Regulation provides greater guarantees in relation to detention than did the Dublin II Regulation, highlighting the greater focus of the EU legislature on the judicial protection of applicants (as per Ghezelbash, para 33). Detention under the Dublin III Regulation must be proportional and is only justified where other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively. Additionally, Article 6 CFR read in the light of the ECtHR interpretation of Article 5 ECHR sets forth that any deprivation of liberty must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable. By analogy, these safeguards are to be in place when identifying a risk of absconding, which is the basis for detention. To the CJEU, it follows from the reasoning above that only a provision of general application could meet such requirements.
Therefore, the CJEU concludes that settled case-law confirming a consistent administrative practice, such as that on the part of the Czech Foreigners Police Section, cannot suffice to conform to Articles 2(n) and 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation. The objective criteria to assess a “risk of absconding” must be established in a binding provision of general application and, in the absence of such provision, detention on this ground is unlawful.
Outcome:
Article 2(n) and Article 28(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction, must be interpreted as requiring Member States to establish, in a binding provision of general application, objective criteria underlying the reasons for believing that an applicant for international protection who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond. The absence of such a provision leads to the inapplicability of Article 28(2) of that regulation.
Observations/comments:
The findings were in line with the Opinion of Advocate General Øe.
On the same day of the decision, the UK Home Office issued a regulation laying down the criteria to be considered when identifying a significant risk of absconding in the UK, thus acting in accordance with the Al Chodor decision.
Al Chodor has been cited amongst many District Courts in France who have found domestic legislation to not sufficiently define the objective criteria of a risk of absconding under Article 2(n) DR III. The Courts have found the detention to, therefore, be unlawful (TGI Paris 17/01187; TGI Douai 17/00400 18 March 2017; 17/00401 TGI Lille 18 March 2017).
Cited National Legislation:
| Cited National Legislation |
| Czech Republic - Aliens Act (326/1999 Coll.) |
Cited Cases:
| Cited Cases |
| ECtHR - Mooren v. Germany [GC], Application No. 11364/03 |
| ECtHR, Kruslin v France, Application No 11801/85 |
| CJEU - Case C-601/15 PPU, J. N. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie |
| CJEU - C‑63/15, Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie |
| CJEU - Joined Cases C 42/10, C-45/10 and C-57/10, Vlaamse Dierenartsenvereniging and Janssens, 12 April 2011, EU:C:2011:253 |
| CJEU - C-550/14, Envirotec Denmark, 26 May 2016, EU:C:2016:354 |
| ECtHR - Del Rio Prada v Spain (no. 42750/09), 21 October 2013 |