CJEU – Case C 180/17, X and Y, 26 September 2018
| Country of Domestic Proceedings: | Netherlands |
| Country of applicant: | Russia |
| Court name: | Court of Justice of the European Union |
| Date of decision: | 26-09-2018 |
| Citation: | Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C 180/17 (X and Y), 26 September 2018 |
| Additional citation: | 26 September 2018 |
Keywords:
| Keywords |
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Effective remedy (right to)
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Description
A general principle of EU law now set out in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.” “[It] is based on Article 13 of the ECHR: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ However, in Community law the protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court. The Court of Justice enshrined the principle in its judgment of 15 May 1986 (Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; see also judgment of 15 October 1987, Case 222/86 Heylens [1987] ECR 4097 and judgment of 3 December 1992, Case C-97/91 Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313. According to the Court, this principle also applies to the Member States when they are implementing Community law. The inclusion of this precedent in the Charter is not intended to change the appeal system laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility. This principle is therefore to be implemented according to the procedures laid down in the Treaties. It applies to the institutions of the Union and of Member States when they are implementing Union law and does so for all rights guaranteed by Union law.” |
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Right to remain pending a decision (Suspensive effect)
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Description
According to Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 7 "Applicants shall be allowed to remain in the Member State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the determining authority has made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance set out in Chapter III. This right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit. Member States can make an exception only where, in accordance with Articles 32 and 34, a subsequent application will not be further examined or where they will surrender or extradite, as appropriate, a person either to another Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a European arrest warrant or otherwise, or to a third country, or to international criminal courts or tribunals." Art 39 APD requires applicants for asylum to have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against a number of listed decisions. Member States must, where appropriate, provide for rules in accordance with their international obligations dealing with the question of whether the remedy shall have the effect of allowing applicants to remain in the Member State concerned pending its outcome. |
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Return
{ return; } );"
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Description
"In the context of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), the process of going back - whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced - to: - one's country of origin; or - a country of transit in accordance with EU or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements; or - another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he/she will be accepted. There are subcategories of return which can describe the way the return is implemented, e.g. voluntary, forced, assisted and spontaneous return; as well as sub-categories which describe who is participating in the return, e.g. repatriation (for refugees)." |
Headnote:
The CJEU ruled on the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the (Recast) Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive.
Facts:
The applicants, both Russian nationals, applied for international protection in the Netherlands. Their applications were rejected with and they were obliged to return to Russia.
The applicants appealed this decision however, the District Court of The Hague dismissed their appeals. They challenged that dismissal before the Council of State. As the appeals had no automatic suspensory effect, the applicants requested, by means of an application for interim relief, that the referring court take interim measures pending the outcome of the appeal proceedings. The referring court granted this request and ruled that the applicants could not be expelled prior to the outcome of the appeal proceedings.
The Council of State referred the question of automatic suspensory effect to the CJEU, deciding to grant interim protection until a ruling on the preliminary reference is issued.
Decision & reasoning:
First, the Court dealt with the question of jurisdiction as the Belgian government argued that the bringing of an appeal, and the decision to confer on that appeal, where appropriate, automatic suspensory effect, against judgments delivered at first instance, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States. The Court found that such questions are in the jurisdiction of the CJEU as they relate specifically to the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive, read in the light of the guarantees provided in Articles 18, 19(2) and 47 of the Charter.
The Court then confirmed that both the wording, and the purpose, of Article 46 of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive and in Article 13 of the Returns Directive only require the Member States to provide for an effective remedy against decisions rejecting an asylum application or imposing a return obligation. This does not mean that States should also be obliged to provide for an appeal against the first-instance appeals, or that an appeal at that instance should have automatic suspensory effect. According to the Court, the Directives in question seek to introduce minimum guarantees, rather than a second instance of judicial review.
The Court referred to its own case law, mainly Gnandi and Samba Diouf, to reiterate its previous finding that the right to an effective remedy means that a remedy before a judicial body should be available to asylum applicants, without establishing a further requirement for two levels of jurisdictions.
The Court also relied on ECtHR case law (Judgment of the ECtHR of 5 July 2016, A.M. v Netherlands), to remind that even in cases of a complaint alleging a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, Article 13 of the ECHR does not require Member States to set up a second level of appellate procedure, nor to confer suspensory effect on judicial proceedings.
Lastly, the Court also addressed the referring court’s statement, regarding the provision under Dutch administrative law of other forms of appeals with an automatic suspensory effect, in the context of the principle of equivalence. While restating the need for equal treatment of breaches of law in comparable situations, be it EU law or national law, it declined to examine whether the principle had been violated in the case in question. As the parties involved did not express doubts on the observance of this principle and the case files did not contain any elements on the comparability of the different forms of appeals under Dutch law, the Court decided that such an issue should be evaluated by the national court.
Outcome:
Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and Article 13 of the Returns Directive (read in the light of Articles 18, 19(2) and 47 of the Charter) does not preclude national legislation which, whilst making provision for appeals against judgments delivered at first instance upholding a decision rejecting an application for international protection and imposing an obligation to return, does not confer on that remedy automatic suspensory effect even in the case where the person concerned invokes a serious risk of infringement of the principle of non-refoulement.
Observations/comments:
In January 2018, AG Bot recommendedthat the CJEU to rule that the provisions of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, the Returns Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union cannot be interpreted as requiring that the legal remedy of an appeal against a negative asylum decision followed by a return order have automatic suspensive effect. Even where the third-country national claims that enforcement of the return decision would result in a serious risk of infringement of the principle of non-refoulement.
However, the right to an effective remedy precludes that the judicial effects of a negative asylum decision and a return decision be maintained despite the repeal of these measures by a first instance authority and requires, in such a situation, the appeal to have an automatic suspensive effect.
Relevant International and European Legislation:
Cited Cases:
| Cited Cases |
| CJEU - C-326/96 Levez |
| CJEU - C-69/10, Brahim Samba Diouf v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration |
| CJEU - C-601/15 PPU, 15 February 2016 |
| CJEU – Case C-181/16 Gnandi, 19 June 2018 |
| ECtHR - A.M. v. Netherlands, no. 29094/09, 5 July 2016 |