Case summaries

It is unlawful to transfer an asylum applicant under the Dublin Regulation to a country, in this case Bulgaria, where the reception conditions conflict with Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

An asylum seeker who was interviewed by telephone during his detention in the waiting zone by an officer of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in premises which were not subject to OFPRA’s director general’s prior approval has not benefited from the appropriate procedural guarantees attached to the examination of his application.

Consequently, the Ministry of Interior’s order rejecting Mr D’s request to enter the French territory, which was taken in light of an OFPRA opinion given in such circumstances, must be annulled.

Arranging for medical or psychological examination is required, for example, when the third country national indicates that they were subject to violence, which left physical or mental signs which can be confirmed by medical or psychological examination. Not all invoked health problems will require an exam. Moreover, in subsequent proceedings this obligation is limited. The authority has no basis to arrange for such an examination when the event indicated in the subsequent application related to violence which was already subject to examination in the first asylum proceedings and was considered to not be credible.

The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.

If an Applicant, whilst his asylum application is being processed, is held in a limited area, this may be in contravention of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). In determining this, the Court may take into account all of the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature, period and effect of the holding of the Applicant and how the holding of the Applicant is enforced.

Limiting the possibility to access classified information to the third country national does not automatically mean that their right to an effective remedy with regard to a return order was infringed. By the same token there has been no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter.

The request for a preliminary ruling reads as follows: “Should Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code interpreted in light of Recital 29 of the preamble and Article 47 of the Charter be understood as creating an obligation for a Member State to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before a court?”

In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court the wording of Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code does not provide clarity as to whether the EU legislator intended to give the term “appeal” the meaning of any measure envisaged in national law or to give the right to an effective remedy before a respective court. If the CJEU, in the preliminary reference proceedings, states that the right to “appeal” should be exercised before a court, the national law excluding judicial control with regard to the Consulate’s decisions refusing the issuance of a visa would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively cooperate in drawing up the facts that support the claim of the applicant.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.