Case summaries

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

The Refugee Appeals Tribunal had found that state protection was available to an applicant who claimed to have suffered many years of sexual abuse by her father and his associates in Nigeria. The High Court quashed the decision on the basis that, as the Tribunal decision had not made a clear finding as to credibility, it was not clear that the Tribunal had considered the personal circumstances and, in particular, the past persecution of the applicant in considering the availability of state protection.

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

The applicant could not provide sufficient proof of her claims that she had been subject to honour-related violence. The information was not found credible and did not constitute a permanent impediment for the enforcement of an expulsion order.

Threats from terrorists against a person who has worked for the international forces in Iraq do not justify the granting of refugee status. Iraqi citizens who have cooperated with the occupying forces do not form a “social group” within the meaning of the Qualification Directive. However, the applicant is entitled to subsidiary protection since there is an armed conflict in the Nineveh region and because the threats by terrorists experienced in the past constitute individual “risk-enhancing” circumstances.

Even though the threats did not originate from the political opinions actually held or imputed to the applicant, they have to be considered as persecution for political grounds within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as interpreted in light of Article 10.1(e) of the Qualification Directive, considering the nature of the persecutors, their goals and their methods.

The Administrative Court overturned a decision of the Immigration Service and granted the applicant asylum on the grounds that his political activities in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) may be known to the Iranian authorities. 

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) rejected an application for asylum and did not assess the risk of serious harm because the applicant was deemed not credible. The Metropolitan Court found this decision unlawful and ordered that the risk of serious harm be analysed in a new procedure. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Court found the assessment of non-refoulement unlawful, since all the available country information assessed concerned Serbia, however, the applicant's country of origin was Kosovo.

Before applying the exclusion clause in a case of complicity in an honour killing, the Court should inquire whether, on the one hand family constraint might have lowered the free will of the applicant and, on the other hand whether his young age might justify that he was more vulnerable to this constraint.