Case summaries

HIV-related marginalisation and discrimination can reach the threshold of seriousness to establish persecution but is not sufficient to be granted international protection. In order to benefit from international protection, it must be established that there are personal reasons for a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to HIV-contamination. In this context, seropositivity can be regarded as being part of a social group, which is a valid persecution ground.  In the case at hand, the Court took into account aspects of vulnerability which are unrelated to HIV-status.

In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.

Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.

The operation of an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm and access to such system by the claimant may not, in a given case, amount to protection. Article 7(2) of the Qualfication Directive is non-prescriptive in nature. The duty imposed on states to take “reasonable steps” imports the concepts of margin of appreciation and proportionality.

It is impossible to advise the Applicant to request the protection of public bodies in a situation in which the public bodies obviously discriminate against a certain religious group. When examining the alternative option of internal relocation, it is necessary to assess the legal and factual availability in terms of the circumstances of the Applicant. It is impossible to build the protection proceedings on a testimony with partial inaccuracies and to revert to translated reports provided by the Applicant.

Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.

The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.

An unmarried woman with a “Western“ lifestyle, who is not religious and has no financial means, is at risk of gender based persecution by non-State actors in case of return to Iraq (continuation of the court’s case law, compare decision of 26 June 2007. A 6 K 394/07)

The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.

The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.

For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.

'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.

This case concerned actors of protection and found with reference to Art 7 of the Qualification Directive that the existence of an effective legal system is not an independent factor for considering the question of whether adequate protection can be provided.

Gender may be a feature defining a social group, so women can be a particular social group.

Violence, beating, and bullying constitute persecution, even if these acts are committed by the local community or individual members thereof.

It is vital to determine whether the applicant obtained help from the state when she requested it or whether there was a genuine (and not just theoretical) opportunity to seek protection.