Case summaries

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the High National Court to refuse granting refugee status. The refusal was founded on the application of an exclusion clause. It was held that the applicant constituted a danger to Spanish security. This decision examined the conditions required to apply this exclusion clause, namely that it has to be determined that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that such danger exists.

This case concerned the application of the principle of family unity, where the sponsor had been granted asylum and subsequently acquired the nationality of the country of refuge.

Before applying the exclusion clause in a case of complicity in an honour killing, the Court should inquire whether, on the one hand family constraint might have lowered the free will of the applicant and, on the other hand whether his young age might justify that he was more vulnerable to this constraint.

Membership of an organisation that was responsible for committing war crimes is not sufficient on its own to justify exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention or Article 12(2)(a) of the Qualification Directive.  Membership of the LTTE or its ‘Intelligence Division” was not enough, on its own, to justify the applicant’s exclusion.

Responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be considered with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and other international legal materials that have come into existence following the adoption of the Refugee Convention.

The decision maker should concentrate on the actual role played by the particular persons, taking all material aspects of that role into account so as to decide whether the required degree of participation is established. The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of some of the relevant factors that should be considered.

Revocation of refugee status was lawful for a leading member of an organisation which has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (president of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - FDLR).

In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.

1. At present, a definition of what constitutes war crimes or crimes against humanity has to be primarily based on the elements of these crimes as determined in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute.
2. In an internal armed conflict, war crimes may be committed not only against the civilian population, but also against combatants.
3. As a rule, acts by combatants which form part of combat operations in an internal armed conflict, and which do not constitute crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity (under Section 3 II (1) (1) of the German Asylum Procedure Act), will also not constitute the exclusion ground of a serious non-political crime.

It is in violation of Art 13 of the ECHR (Right to an Effective Remedy) in conjunction with Art 3 of the ECHR (Prohibition of Torture) that the applicant may not await the court’s decision on his request for a temporary injunction against his expulsion in the Netherlands, even though he has an arguable claim under Art 3 of the ECHR. Further that Art 39 of the Procedures Directive is not correctly implemented in Dutch law.

The CALL ruled that exclusion clauses are exceptional provisions with very serious consequences and should therefore be applied in a restrictive manner. There is a presumption of responsibility vis-à-vis persons holding high positions in a regime that is guilty of committing serious human rights violations, but such a presumption is refutable. It does not suffice to refer to the general situation in the country of origin at the time when the applicant held the position.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the High National Court against the decision of the Ministry of Interior to refuse granting refugee status. The refusal was based on the application of an exclusion clause due to the applicant’s alleged membership of a terrorist group and for having committed serious crimes.

It was discussed whether this exclusion clause had been applied lawfully and also if, alternatively, the applicant could be authorised to stay in Spain for humanitarian reasons since, if he was expulsed, there was a risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment

The House of Lords considered a number of issues arising out of the proposed deportation of three foreign nationals on the basis that each was a danger to the national security of the United Kingdom. The Court made three particularly relevant findings: (1) that Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention could be invoked to exclude an individual from the provisions of the Convention on the basis of acts committed after the applicant was recognised as a refugee; (2) Diplomatic assurances as to the treatment of an individual were relevant to assessing how an applicant would be treated upon return to their home State, though their assessment was a matter of fact, and; (3) relying on evidence obtained by torture in a criminal trial did not, as a matter of law, always amount to a flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.