Case summaries

The absence of food provision raised an issue of Article 3 in respect of the first applicant, given his state of total dependency on the Hungarian government during his stay at the Röszke transit zone. The physical conditions of the container in which the family stayed in, the unsuitable facilities for children, irregularities in the provision of medical services, and the prolonged stay in the area amounted to a violation of Article 3 in respect of the applicant mother and the children.

The family’s stay at the Röszke transit zone amounted to deprivation of liberty due to, inter alia, the lack of any domestic legal provisions fixing the maximum duration of the applicants’ stay, the excessive duration of the applicants’ stay and the conditions in the transit zone. Their deprivation of liberty was unlawful under Article 5 (1), as there was no strictly defined statutory basis for the applicants’ detention and no formal decision complete with reasons for detention had been issued by the Hungarian authorities.

Article 5 (4) was also violated because he applicants did not have avenue in which the lawfulness of their detention could have been decided promptly by a court.

The CJEU found that the judge assigned to rule upon the applicant’s detention should have transmitted his request for international protection to the competent authority so it could be registered, and the applicant could enjoy his rights provided by Directive 2013/33. It also found that he should not have been detained since he was protected by his applicant for international protection’s status under Directives 2013/33 and 2013/32.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

An asylum seeker is entitled to request the temporary termination of his or her stay in an accommodation centre and to seek alternative accommodation if compliance with the distancing rules of the Saxon Corona Protection Ordinance is not possible in the centre.

The Court concluded on the immediate release of an Egyptian national from detention. The judgment referred to the detention conditions for vulnerable persons that suffer from serious health conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Foreign asylum seekers without employment have a right to be exempted from the payment of health care contributions under Art. 8(16) of Law No. 537/1993, irrespective of whether they are seeking a job for the first time or have worked in the past. The entitlement to this benefit depends solely on the condition of “non-employment” under Art. 19(1), (2) and (7) of Legislative Decree 150/2015 and to the declaration by the non-employed individual of their availability to work. Denying this benefit to jobless asylum seekers amounts to discrimination.

The applicant, a victim of rape and forced marriage, has a subjective right to reception which allows her to live a life compatible with human dignity in light of her vulnerability and the minimum norms of reception. This right is entirely linked with FEDASIL’s competences to ensure reception is adapted to an individual’s circumstances. The statement of the asbl SOS VIOL clearly justifies why the applicant should be accommodated in a Local Reception Initiative, reception which is better adapted to the symptoms that she suffers from, notably anxiety and fear of men.The criticism of the asbl's statement whilist not providing any pschological assessment themselves, meant that FEDASIL’s decision not to transfer the applicant to adapted accommodation was negligent. 

The applicant is entitled to be transferred to individual accommodation and moral damages in the region of 2.500 euros.  

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.

The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.