Case summaries
This case is concerned with whether an appeal against the lawfulness of an asylum applicant’s detention was allowed. Thus the prejudicial question was formulated questioning whether the measure under article 8(3)(a-b) recast Reception Conditions Directive is valid with regards to the provisions in Article 6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) subject to Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The case shows how the legal amendment which entered into force on 13 November 2015 changed the situation of asylum seekers by deleting the legal basis for detention formulated as “preventing from abusing the asylum proceedings”. Instead, article 87 (1) (3) of the Law on granting protection to foreigners in the territory of the Republic of Poland reflects article 8 (3)(d) of the recast Reception Directive and states that an applicant can be detained in order to issue or enforce the return decision if towards the applicant there is an ongoing return proceedings or there was a return decision issued and the applicant already had the opportunity to access the asylum procedure, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the application was merely made in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision.
The Border Guard relied on this provision when prolonging the detention of the applicant in the present case arguing it with the need to secure the proceedings regarding international protection. In the opinion of the Court, this provision cannot be used in the situation where the applicant is not subject to return proceedings and no such decision has been issued so far. That is why he should be released.
The failure of Fedasil to accommodate an asylum seeking child led to a risk of violating his Article 3 rights. There was a prima facie case that he had lodged an application for asylum and was, thus, entitled to material reception conditions.
The ECtHR recognised a breach of Article 3 ECHR in respect of the conditions at a Greek detention centre, and a breach of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 13 in respect of failures by the Greek authorities in the processing of the Applicant’s claim. However, his rights under Article 5 had not been breached because the detention was prescribed by law and served a legitimate purpose.
The transfer of an applicant for asylum to Malta violates the Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (“Dublin III Regulation”) because Malta’s asylum procedures and system show systemic deficiencies with the inherent risk of subjecting an applicant for asylum to inhuman or degrading treatment.
There is a real risk that, due to overcrowded accommodation, Hungary can no longer receive returning Dublin claimants. Because of inadequate shelter, the claimant and her two minor children may be subjected to accommodation conditions which contravene Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Before the return of a vulnerable Dublin claimant occurs, Hungary must first be asked to provide guarantees of adequate shelter.
While accepting that Hungary is the responsible EU State for processing the applicant's asylum application (Article 18(1) Dublin Regulation III), the Court held that a transfer to Hungary may not occur due to systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary, that would put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 3 para 2 Dublin III) .
A lack of attention paid to the vulnerability of the applicants as asylum seekers and children and their subsequent exposure to conditions of extreme poverty outside the State reception system has led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The procedure of requesting the suspensive effect of a decision rejecting an asylum application and ordering the transfer of an applicant to another Member State does not amount to an effective remedy under the Convention.
Upon preliminary examination, it cannot be excluded that a decision of an administrative court, limited to making a Dublin transfer conditional upon the assurance of the competent authorities in the country of destination that accommodation will be provided for the family in question, violates the right to an effective remedy under Art. 19(4)(1) of the Basic Law.
Since the removal might lead to severe disadvantages for the applicants which cannot easily be compensated for and which outweigh the consequences of a preliminarily prolonged presence of the persons concerned, the removal has to be suspended until the Federal Constitutional Court has reached its final decision.
The legislative prohibition on the right to work for those seeking international protection, for a period of over 7 years, does not breach the right to earn a livelihood under the Constitution, nor does it violate rights codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or the right to private life under the European Convention on Human Rights.