Case summaries

The Federal Administrative Court rules, that the significant risk of absconding for ‘Dublin-detention’ orders must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The sole existence of a ground for detention as set out in Art. 76a(2) AuG does not automatically indicate a significant risk absconding. Such an order is unlawful and must be rescinded. The Court ‘warns’ the SEM that the current practices are very concerning and require adaptation.

The appeal procedure dealt with the question of whether the complainant is to be classified as a minor according to Article 2 lit. g of the Dublin III Regulation, with the consequence that Article 8 para. 1 of the Dublin III Regulation is applicable and the complainant can therefore remain with her sister in Switzerland. In particular the term “legally present” and the procedure of taking evidence were discussed in depth.

A member state may derogate from Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 (the “Dublin-III-Regulation“), by examining an application for international protection despite the fact that the members state is not responsible for the examination according to the criteria laid down in the Dublin-III-Regulation.

When assessing Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation (the discretionary clause), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (the “Federal Office”) must give priority to the best interest of the child and the right to respect of family life. Furthermore, the Federal Office must take due account of the possibility of family reunification in accordance with Article 6 (3) (a) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

In the event that an application for international protection allows for family reunification and also safeguards the best interests of the child, there is no room for discretion by the Federal Office in making an assessment under Article 17 (1) of the Dublin-III-Regulation.

Although Article 17 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation determines the responsibility of the Member States to examine applications for international protection, it governs not only the relationship between the Member States but also serves to protect fundamental rights. Thus, it also aims at the protection of the individual and provides for a subjective right, which can be enforced in a court of law. 

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary). 

The Supreme Administrative Court attempted to answer the question whether the objective criteria for identification of the “existing risk of absconding” in order to apply Article 28(2) of Dublin III Regulation have to be set out in an act of parliament, or whether the wider interpretation of the phrase “defined in law” contained in Article 2(n) of Dublin III Regulation should be adopted. The court decided to refer a preliminary question to the CJEU.  

The Czech Regional Court dealt with an application concerning the unlawfulness of a decision taken under § 129 (1) of the Aliens Act. After engaging in textual and teleological analysis of the said national provision, the Court concluded that because the Member State failed to establish objective criteria for assessing the risk of absconding, the rule laid down in Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation is not applicable in the Czech Republic.  

Detention pending Dublin transfer can only be ordered on the basis of Article 28 Dublin-III-Regulation, which contains autonomous provisions on the detention of foreigner. Additional criteria laid down by national laws are required in order to specify the condition of "risk of absconding". A deportation detention order that does not even refer to Art. 28 Dublin-III-Regulation is unlawful.

Art. 2 lit. (n) of the Dublin III Regulation requires objective criteria defined by domestic law for the ‘risk of absconding’, which is a necessary requirement for the imposition of detention pending transfer according to Art. 28 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.

The domestic legal provision of § 76 (2) FPG lacks the necessary objective criteria defined by law for the ‘risk of absconding’ according to the Dublin III Regulation and is therefore not a sufficient legal basis for detention pending deportation in a transfer procedure according to Art. 28 (2) Dublin III Regulation.

Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the German Act of the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory (Residence Act) does not comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 which defines ‘risk of absconding’ as the existence of reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by law. Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 5 of the Residence Act names ‘risk of absconding’ as a reason for detention but lacks the required objective criteria to determine the existence of the ‘risk of absconding’. Therefore according to the current legal situation in Germany detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 cannot be based on the detention reason ‘risk of absconding’.

The detention reasons named in Section 62 subsection 3 first sentence No. 2 and No. 3 of the Residence Act comply with the requirements in Art. 2(n) Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013. Detention in order to ensure the transfer as per Art. 28 Dublin III Regulation No 604/2013 can be based on these provisions.