Case summaries

The notion of “well-founded fear” has not been precisely defined. However, it is commonly accepted that it must necessarily contain two elements: a subjective element (the party has a real and credible fear of persecution) and an objective element (this fear has a basis in reality).  A person applying for refugee status should present facts and possibly evidence confirming that they were persecuted in the past or that they fear persecution upon returning to their country of origin. Other reasons for a foreigner leaving their country of origin or fearing a return to their country of origin are immaterial as regards recognition of their refugee status.

Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

B.G., a citizen of the Russian Federation, applied for refugee status, citing persecution experienced due to his brother being in prison. The authorities of both instances questioned his credibility, citing numerous inconsistencies in the various testimonies given. The foreignor then appealed to the Regional Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the proceedings had been conducted properly and referring to the fact that the foreignor was able to flee internally in his country of origin.

The authority conducting the proceedings provides, where necessary, translations into Polish of documents in a foreign language that are admissible as evidence in refugee status proceedings.

The option of internal flight means that if there is a part of the country of origin where there are no circumstances justifying the foreignor's fear of persecution or serious harm and it can reasonably be presumed that the foreignor will be able to move there without impediment, there is no well-founded fear of persecution or actual risk of serious harm in the country of origin. If the conditions in one region do not suit the foreignor, he can try to move to another part of the country.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

The application by the Applicant for the assignment of a legal adviser for the appeal proceedings was rejected by the Asylum Court because it was late, as the Applicant had only submitted the application after the expiry of the one-month transition period. The Constitutional Court annulled the corresponding transitional regulation on grounds of unconstitutionality: a deadline of only one month was too short to deal with the lack of understanding of asylum seekers of the language and law.

The applicant stated that he had been a member of the Taliban amongst other things. The Federal Asylum Agency (BAA) declared that the expulsion of the applicant to Afghanistan was permissible. The Asylum Court acted on the assumption of the existence of the ground for exclusion from asylum of ”Crimes against humanity“ and therefore granted neither asylum nor subsidiary protection, but revoked the expulsion to Afghanistan. The Constitutional Court allowed the appeal by the applicant against this decision as sufficient findings were not established in relation to the assumed crime against humanity.

There is not currently an indiscriminate conflict in Afghanistan (as a whole, or in any province) within the meaning of Article 15(c). Internal protection is in general possible in Kabul; however it is unreasonable to expect certain categories of women to seek internal protection within Afghanistan.

1. The expulsion of a recognised refugee may only take place subject to the requirements of Article 21 (3) in conjunction with (2) and Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive.

2. Compelling grounds for public security or order according to Article 24 (1) of the Qualification Directive do not presuppose any outstanding acts of extraordinary danger in support of international terrorism; neither does specific involvement of a sympathiser suffice unless it is characterised by a large degree of continuity and as such shapes and influences the environment of the terrorist organisation.