Case summaries

In a situation of unlawful detention – unlawful because it did not comply with national and European norms on the detention of illegally staying citizens – as well as inhuman and degrading conditions in the Identification and Expulsion Centre, the revolt by the four Defendants should be considered as proportionate and the alleged conduct should be treated as legitimate defence.

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

Acts of a criminal nature cannot be equated with persecution within the meaning of grounds cited under the Convention. Public authorities in the country of origin, which the family of the foreignor did not contact, are supposed to provide protection against risks posed by individual citizens.

The Applicants are not members of a particular social group as defined by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as neither their statements, nor the generally available information would indicate that Serbia considers their citizens originating from Kosovo as a particular group with specific characteristics.

Relying upon the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to ECHR, Article 3 and the decision of the Constitutional Court Up-96/09, as referred to by the court of first instance, the Supreme Court ruled that minimal social and economic protection for an individual who is dependent on state aid does not represent a violation of dignity and therefore does not provide sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. Poor socio-economic conditions, in which the majority of inhabitants of an individual country have found themselves, do not represent sufficient grounds for subsidiary protection. 

This case concerns whether there is an armed conflict in Iraq which meets the threshold of indiscriminate violence set out in Article 15(c) Qualification Directive, such that all applicants from Iraq require subsidiary protection.

This case concerns the interpretation and application of Article 15 of the Dublin Regulation, commonly known as the humanitarian clause, in a specific set of circumstances where the asylum seeker concerned has a daughter in law who is seriously ill, and on account of cultural factors, at risk or has grandchildren below the age of majority, who, as a result of the daughter-in-law’s illness are in need of care and the asylum seeker concerned is both willing and able to support them. The CJEU held in circumstances such as those Article 15(2) must be interpreted so as to make that Member State responsible for the asylum seekers claim. This is applicable even if the Member State which was responsible pursuant to the criteria laid down in Chapter III of the Regulation did not make that request.

The case examined the allegations of five Afghan nationals that their detention conditions in Pagani detention centre were in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, that they did not have access to an effective remedy (Article 13) and that they were deprived of their liberty and security as well as of their right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided speedily by a Court (Article 5 para 4). 

The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains a finite list of grounds on which refugee status may be recognised and does not include victims of war, natural disasters, or famine, family situation, unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, or poverty.

The assessment of whether the foreignor's fear of persecution is justified must therefore be performed with reference to the individual case in question and in the light of the general social, legal, political, and economic situation of the country of origin of the foreignor applying for refugee status.

The Applicant left his country of origin (Iran) in 2003 having been arrested, illegally detained and tortured because of his participation in demonstrations against the regime in 1999. He told the Committee that he had occasionally participated in the anti-regime activities of Iranians in Greece, and that he did not wish to return to Iran because he feared that he would be imprisoned again and would be subjected to torture. Concerning his religious beliefs, he stated that he was an atheist. The Committee accepted that the torture suffered by the Applicant in his country of origin constituted previous persecution. However, the Committee believed that there was no a well-founded fear of persecution now or in the future because of his prior actions, nor because of his prior actions in conjunction with circumstances which occurred in Greece (participation in Iranian movements), nor even because of the Applicant's atheism and, therefore, that the fear of persecution was not well-founded. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that “there may have been situations in which the Applicant was persecuted in the country of origin, but he has no present or future fear of persecution there. However, it is appropriate to recognise him as a refugee because of the compelling reasons arising from previous persecution, especially when the persecution he suffered was particularly atrocious”; and it unanimously recognised the Applicant's refugee status because it held that the Applicant had suffered terrible persecution in the past because of his anti-regime activities (political opinion) without the situation in his country of origin having since improved, and because the Applicant continued to suffer the consequences of his psychological harm, meaning that his return to Iran and his life there would be intolerable.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the expulsion of an Algerian national from Slovakia to Algeria, in contempt of an interim measure issued by the Court, was in violation of Articles 3, 13 and 34 of the Convention.