Case summaries

A potential violation of Art. 3 of the Convention can be found when a person risks to be extradited to a country where practice of ill-treatment of detainees are reported by reliable sources, notwithstanding possible assurances by the involved public prosecutors of that country.

Given the irreversible and particular serious nature of the harm which might occur if risks relevant under art. 3 of the Convention materialise, an effective remedy to avoid such a harm within the meaning of art. 13 of the Convention requires both an independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim, and a remedy with automatic suspensive effect. 

This case concerned the application of the principle of family unity, where the sponsor had been granted asylum and subsequently acquired the nationality of the country of refuge.

1. In principle, a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) has to be considered as political persecution according to Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
2. In Nigeria, FGM is still widespread in all known forms. For the Edo ethnic group, it is usually performed between seven and fourteen days after birth.
3. The number of circumcisions performed (among the Edo ethnic group) during puberty has decreased significantly in recent years and circumcisions in adulthood are no longer performed, or they are only carried out in a small number of cases.

In the present case the court found that it was unlikely that the applicant was at risk of FGM considering her age (five years) and the fact that both her parents opposed the practice. Further, the requirements of ‘Prohibition of deportation’ (Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act) were not established; it was considered unlikely that the applicant would actually return to Nigeria as her mother had residency in Germany.

The facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive was deemed to be applicable both in the decision-making on the granting of refugee status and in the decision-making on the granting of subsidiary protection. The "reduced standard of probability" (of sufficient safety), as it has been developed by the German asylum jurisprudence, is no longer relevant for the examination of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In case of a concrete danger of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of deportation of Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act applies unconditionally, this includes deportations to signatory states of the European Court on Human Rights.

This case concerns the criteria for determining a serious individual threat and the necessary level of indiscriminate violence in an internal armed conflict.In order for Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive to apply, it is necessary to determine the level of indiscriminate violence in the territory of an internal armed conflict. When determining the necessary level of indiscriminate violence, not only acts which contravene international law, but any acts of violence which put life and limb of civilians at risk, have to be taken into account. In the context of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive, an internal nexus must exist between the serious harm (or threats thereof) suffered in the past, and the risk of future harm.

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

Refugee protection was not granted, since the applicant, as a member of the particular social group of "Djoula living in the South of  Côte d’Ivoire" (Art 10.1(d) Qualification Directive) was not subject to political persecution when he left Côte d’Ivoire in 2001. The court found that group persecution was not established due to the insufficient frequency of acts of persecution against members of this group and therefore in case of return, the applicant would not face such group persecution.

In appealing a decision to transfer the wife and children of an asylum applicant to Poland, the applicants relied on the humanitarian provision in Art 15 Dublin Regulation. They also noted Art 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation states separation of family members should be avoided and that such a separation would violate Art 8 ECHR. The Austrian Asylum Court allowed the appeal on the basis of Austrian asylum law, under which family members of an asylum applicant have the right to receive the same status as the applicant.

The accelerated procedure (in this case, applicants from a safe country of origin) guarantees the individual assessment of the applicant’s situation and their right to a remedy with suspensive effect.

Even if an asylum applicant meets the conditions for provding subsidiary protection, he will be excluded from eligibility for subsidiary protection if there are serious grounds for believing that he represents a danger to society or a danger to the Member State in which he is staying.

It follows from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights that signatory states to the Convention (Convention for theProtection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) are under an obligation not to hand over/deport a person to a country where he might be at risk of treatment which is contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In the case in question, however, the subject of the judicial review was not the decision to deport the Appellant, but the Respondent’s decision not to grant asylum and not to provide subsidiary protection as requested by the Appellant.