Case summaries

French legislative provisions concerning the non suspensive effect of the judicial remedy under the accelerated procedure are not manifestly incompatible with the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directives.  

An expulsion order in relation to an elderly woman with a deteriorating medical condition gave rise to a real risk of a violation of Art 3 and Art 8 ECHR. In light of this risk, the Asylum Court held that the sovereignty clause in the Dublin Regulation should be applied in combination with Article 15 of the same Regulation, even though the latter was not directly applicable in this case.

After the expiry of the six months’ time limit for transfer, the responsibility for examining the applications for asylum lies with the Member State in which these applications were lodged. This Member State shall examine the applications in accordance with national asylum law.

When determining whether the maximum period for detention pending removal under the Returns Directive is exceeded, the following periods must be included: (1) periods of detention prior to the application of the Directive by the Member State; (2) periods of detention pending an asylum claim where no decision is made to transfer the individual from ‘detention pending removal’ to ‘detention pending asylum claim’; (3) periods of detention pending judicial review of the deportation. In addition, the ‘reasonableness’ of the prospects of removal must take account of whether removal can take place within the maximum period of detention time, and once the maximum period is exceeded, the individual can no longer be detained for the purpose of removal.

The scope of the Reception Conditions Directive can be limited in relation to asylum applicants that do not respect their obligation to  prove their identity in order to enable the national authorities to verify whether any prior applications had been made. In this case, the Reception Conditions Directive was set aside following noncompliance with Art 18(1) EURODAC Regulation, which requires all asylum applicants above the age of 14 to agree to have their fingerprints recorded.

In this case the Council of State had to determine whether the Reception Conditions Directive continues to apply to asylum applicants that are subject to procedures under the Dublin Regulation. The Council found Member States are bound by the obligations in the Directive until the handling of the applicant’s case or the transfer to the Responsible Member State is enforced.

It is in violation of Art 13 of the ECHR (Right to an Effective Remedy) in conjunction with Art 3 of the ECHR (Prohibition of Torture) that the applicant may not await the court’s decision on his request for a temporary injunction against his expulsion in the Netherlands, even though he has an arguable claim under Art 3 of the ECHR. Further that Art 39 of the Procedures Directive is not correctly implemented in Dutch law.

The Kenyan applicant was a potential victim of female genital mutilation (FGM) and she faced forced marriage upon return. The Court stated that even if there was a risk of persecution in case of a return to the country of origin, the applicant could reasonably be expected to relocate internally as it was feasible in the circumstances.

This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established.  When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity. 

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order 

The case addressed the absence of procedural guarantees in the context of appointing a Commissioner and assessing the applicant’s level of maturity with regard to the need for special treatment of an unaccompanied minor.

The lack of personal persecution of an alien applicant does not preclude the recognition of refugee status if it is shown that there is an objective and well-founded fear of individual persecution in the applicant's country.

The Court found that the decision of the Minister for Public Order was improperly reasoned in that itfailed to comply with the Administration's obligations to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, to consider the merits of the applicant's claims based on objective evidence, to conform with procedural guarantees when assessing applications by unaccompanied minors, and to interpret the applicant's claims within the true intended meaning of the words used. It found that the Administration had failed to investigate the applicant's risk of persecution on the grounds of his racial origins and membership of (participation in) a particular social group (young male Hazara) in view of the prevailing conditions in his country.  The contested decision was also defective because of a failure to examine the existence of conditions for protection on humanitarian grounds.