Case summaries
An asylum applicant who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must still be regarded as a “minor” for the purposes of that provision.
The Appellant and the appellant’s children were applying for leave to remain in Sweden due to affiliation with their husband and father respectively who had been granted a permanent right of residency in Sweden as a refugee - despite them not being able to prove their identities. Due to the appellant’s lack of relevant documentation for her and the children, the court had to consider the circumstances in which a person can be granted alleviation of evidentiary burden in terms of proving their identity.
The Migration Court of Appeal granted the appeal and held that the appellant and the children would be granted an alleviation of evidentiary burden. It further referred the case back to the Swedish Migration Agency who would have to complete a DNA-test aimed at establishing the kinship of the family and subsequently try the case again.
In the case of doubts about family relationships, both the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) and the Austrian embassy abroad must for the purpose of family reunification enable applicants to have a DNA-analysis carried out at their request and inform them of this possibility. The purpose of this DNA-analysis is to enable the applicant to eliminate existing doubts about a family relationship and thus to achieve family reunification.
The applicants appealed the decision to deny family reunification and family extension in relation to the refugee status of their daughter. The Administration denied this claim based on the fact that the applicants have a different nationality than their daughter, which would contravene the requirement established in article 40.a) of Law 12/2009. Article 41 of said Act, however, addresses this specific situation; However, the requirement of developing this provision by regulation had not been complied by Spain. The Court assesses whether this article should be applicable in the current case, despite not presenting the requirement of regulation, and concludes that the similarity of the wording of articles 40 and 41 is enough as to deem the latter applicable.
A grave psychological disease (post-traumatic stress disorder – PTSd) is a reason to grant interim legal protection against deportation, if the applicant is in a state of self-endangerment or potentially suicidal in case of a deportation.
The concept of family life under Article 8 ECHR and under the Portuguese Constitution requires the existence of an effective connection between the individuals, which also presupposes the existence of a financial interdependency.
A refusal to permit re-unification of family members with a child granted asylum in the United Kingdom can constitute a disproportionate breach of the right to respect for family life enjoyed by all family members under Article 8 ECHR despite the Immigration Rules not providing for family reunification where a child has been granted asylum in the UK.
When balancing the applicant’s right to family reunification and the protection of the rights of others in relation to the welfare of the state, which would be lessened if the application for family reunification were approved, the Supreme Court favours the latter since according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, countries enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when protecting the right to family life.
The first subparagraph of Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive allows the imposition of integration measures of Third Country Nationals in principle. However the general principle of proportionality requires integration measures to actually fulfil the objective of integrating TCNs and not delimiting the possibility of family reunion.
Member States must therefore consider the individual circumstances of the applicant which can lead to dispensing with the integration exam where family reunification would otherwise be excessively difficult.
This case related to two third country nationals who were ordered to leave the Netherlands, without being granted a period for voluntary departure, on the basis that they constituted a risk to public policy.
The CJEU gave guidance on the meaning of Article 7(4) of the Returns Directive, stating that the concept of a ‘risk to public policy’ should be interpreted strictly with an individualised assessment of the personal conduct of the person. Suspicion or conviction for a criminal offence was a relevant consideration. However, it was unnecessary to conduct a new assessment solely relating to the period for voluntary departure where the person had already been found to constitute a risk to public policy.