Case summaries

The words "2, 4 and" and the sentence "This shall also apply in the cases of Section 3 para. 2 no. 1, if the decision is connected with the adoption of a measure terminating the stay". in Section 16 para. 1 BFA-Procedural Act (Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Verfahrensgesetz-BFA-VG), violates Article 136 para. 2 B-VG. The provision was repealed by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional.

Family unity and the best interests of the child are high priorities when applying the Dublin III Regulation.  A child who has applied for international protection in Germany but has members of his family in Greece is entitled to family unity with them in Germany. The Dublin III Regulation specifies that this transfer should be carried out within six months of a Member State’s acceptance of the take charge or take back request. The time period to transfer starts from the Member State’s acceptance of the request. The right of the asylum seeker to be transferred within said time-limit is a subjective right. Whilst Germany had accepted the take charge request they had only planned to transfer the applicants at a time after the six month deadline. An interim injunction was therefore necessary in order to ensure that the rights of the applicant were respected. 

The case concerns the validity of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the Receptions Conditions Directive in the light of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 

The case concerns the calculation of time limits for detention for the purpose of a Dublin transfer under Article 28 of the Dublin III Regulation (DRIII).

The Court of Justice of the European Union rejected the actions brought by Hungary and Slovakia seeking the annulment of the so-called “Relocation Decision”.

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.

This case dealt with the issue that arose from the dissenting judgement of Judge Hogan in the case at the Court of Appeal – that is whether the Irish legislative provision preventing (without limitation) an asylum seeker from seeking, or entering, employment in the period before the final determination of his asylum claim was contrary to the right to work under the Irish Constitution and, if it was, to what extent could an asylum seeker claim the benefit of that right in the Constitution and to what extent could the State legitimately restrict that right.
 

The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.