Case summaries
In a decision on whether the return of an unaccompanied minor to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation is unlawful in light of Art. 3 ECHR and therefore the sovereignty clause should be used, Art. 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFRU – best interest of the child as a primary consideration for authorities) is significant.
The European Court of Human Rights held that there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention with regards to the applicant’s living conditions in the detention centre of Samos and the authorities’ lack of diligence to provide him with the appropriate medical assistance. Furthermore, it found a violation of Article 5 para 1 and 4 regarding the lawfulness of his detention and his right to liberty.
For the purposes of the first sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83, a person receives protection or assistance from an agency of the United Nations other than UNHCR when that person has actually availed himself of that protection or assistance.
Article 1D of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive refers, merely excludes from the scope of that Convention those persons who are at present receiving protection or assistance from an organ or agency of the United Nations other than UNHCR. It follows from the clear wording of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention that only those persons who have actually availed themselves of the assistance provided by UNRWA come within the clause excluding refugee status set out therein, which must, as such, be construed narrowly and cannot therefore also cover persons who are or have been eligible to receive protection or assistance from that agency.
The case concerned an appeal before the High National Court against the decision of the Spanish Asylum and Refugee Office (Ministry of Interior) rejecting an application for refugee status based on the fact that the applicant entered the EU through Greece. Therefore, following the Dublin II Regulation, Greece would be the responsible country for examining the application for asylum. The High National Court stated that after passing the six month period established by Art 19.3 of the Regulation CE/343/2003 without executing the transfer of the applicant to a Member State considered responsible for the examination, Spain was the responsible country for the case.
The facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive was deemed to be applicable both in the decision-making on the granting of refugee status and in the decision-making on the granting of subsidiary protection. The "reduced standard of probability" (of sufficient safety), as it has been developed by the German asylum jurisprudence, is no longer relevant for the examination of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In case of a concrete danger of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of deportation of Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act applies unconditionally, this includes deportations to signatory states of the European Court on Human Rights.
The Family Reunification Directive does not make a distinction between whether a family relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State. An application for family reunification may not be refused where the sponsor, the resident within EU territory, has proved that he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who, given the level of his resources, will, nevertheless, be entitled to claim special assistance in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living costs, tax refunds, or income-support measures.
No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.
This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:
- Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
- Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.
The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.
For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.
'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.
Failure to receive basic services does not represent a reduction within the meaning of Art 16 Reception Conditions Directive. The Reception Conditions Directive does not standardise decision deadlines with regard to applications for the granting of basic services.