Case summaries

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

One cannot demand recognition of refugee status pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention where protection can be provided pursuant to Article 1D of the Convention. The phrase used in the first sentence of Article 1D of the Convention – “persons who are at present receiving… protection or assistance” – relates to those Palestinians who could avail themselves of protection on the date of the Convention, i.e., on 28 July 1951., and to their direct descendants born after that date, provided they remain under the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). “Protection or assistance” for Palestinians is provided solely in areas under the UNRWA mandate. Therefore, exclusions from protection under the Geneva Convention relate only to those Palestinians who reside permanently in those areas.

The applicants were unlawfully detained and had no effective remedy to challenge their detention. There was a finding that they had been collectively expelled, given the context of their expulsion along with many others of the same nationality, and as their individual circumstances had not been adequately taken into consideration. 

Application to give suspensive effect to a decision by the Minister for Public Order 

This case concerned deportation of a recognized refugee (Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees) after a conviction for a criminal offence under common law. 

Immediate deportation would expose the applicant to the risk of suffering irreparable harm in the event that his application for annulment is successful. Because of the severity of that harm, moves to deport him must be given suspensive effect until there has been a final decision on his application for annulment, even though the decision to deport him was motivated by the protection of public order.

The case also considered ending the applicant's detention andreturning the refugee residence permit, which had been withdrawn, to the applicant. 

The proposed deportation of the applicant to Iran would violate Article 3 ECHR, and as she was prevented from having the merits of her claim examined due to non-compliance with procedural time limits, there was a breach of Article 13 ECHR.  This was because she had no chance to challenge the decision on appeal, or access to a remedy with suspensive effect.

The issue of an applicant’s nationality is integral to a claim for refugee status. In the great majority of asylum applications the nationality of the applicant is not in issue, but when it is put in doubt decision-makers must address it. Failure to do so would offend the nationality logic that underlies the refugee definition set out in Art 1A(2). The burden of proof in respect of nationality is on the applicant although the evidential burden may shift.

In assessing whether a state is a safe third country with regard to its interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was not sufficient to assess whether the foreign state’s interpretation of the Convention was reasonable. The Secretary of State for the Home Department had to be satisfied that the foreign state applied the one true interpretation of the Convention decided upon by the UK Courts.