Case summaries
The situation of the homosexuals which currently prevails in Iraq enables them to be considered as forming a group whose members are likely to face acts of such gravity that they may amount to persecution in the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The concept of internal protection only applies if the asylum-seeker is able to reach the relevant region in a reasonable manner. In the light of Art 8 of the Qualification Directive an asylum-seeker can only be reasonably expected to stay in another part of his country of origin if he does not face risks in this region. The general situation in the region of internal protection and the applicant’s personal circumstances has to be taken into account. It is irrelevant for the granting of refugee status whether such risks likewise exist in the region of origin.
The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.
Gender may be a feature defining a social group, so women can be a particular social group.
Violence, beating, and bullying constitute persecution, even if these acts are committed by the local community or individual members thereof.
It is vital to determine whether the applicant obtained help from the state when she requested it or whether there was a genuine (and not just theoretical) opportunity to seek protection.
This case concerned the exclusion from refugee status of a Taliban informer. The Supreme Administrative Court did not apply the exclusion clause in Art IF(b) (corresponding to § 87 paragraph 2 of the Finnish Aliens Act).The Court held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted in the narrowest possible manner.
The Supreme Administrative Court defined the standard of proof of a “reasonable likelihood” of persecution and a “real risk” of serious harm. Where these criteria are met, the court must give precedence to international commitments and not apply the mandatory national rules of procedure (e.g. for an action that is out of time).
Extremely serious previous persecution was sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution even when it appeared unlikely to recur.
The applicant, a Tunisian national, having served a sentence in Italy on the charge, among others, of criminal conspiracy, faced deportation from Italy to Tunisia, where he risked ill-treatment.
The Court found that the deportation of the applicant to Tunisia would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The absolute nature of Article 3 meant that the conduct of the applicant was irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.
The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High National Court’s decision to reject her asylum application. She claimed to have experienced persecution in Nigeria for religious reasons: her parents were killed in a religious confrontation between Muslims and Catholics. However, she did not explain how this fact was linked to a subsequent persecution. The Court held that the applicant was not a victim of religious persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, but that she had fled from a general conflict and a situation of political instability.
Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order
The case concerned deportation of a recognized refugee (Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees) after a conviction for a criminal offence under common law. Final conviction for a particularly serious crime is not sufficient legitimate justification for an act of deportation.; instead, the Administration is required to issue a specific ruling that the convicted refugee, given the circumstances under which he committed the offence and his personality, is thereafter a risk to the community as a whole to such an extent that his stay in Greece is no longer tolerable and that his immediate removal from the country is required.
A threat to the legal interests of public order does not constitute a reason to revoke refugee status as this is not explicitly referred to in the reasons for terminating refugee status in accordance with Article 1C of the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, it falls within the competence of the Council of State to annul a ruling, issued by relying on Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which involves the deportation of an alien who has been recognized as having refugee status under the said international Convention and who continues to have refugee status.
The case also considered the lack of competence of the body which issued the contested decision (General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order instead of the competent Minister for Public Order).