Case summaries
The appellant mother (M) appealed against a Court of Appeal decision upholding a finding by an Asylum and Immigration Tribunal that her two children (aged 12 and 9), who were British citizens, could reasonably be expected to follow her when she was removed to Tanzania.
The CALL considered that the internal protection alternative rule limits access to international protection and found that, in order for the rule to be applied, it is up to the asylum authority to demonstrate (1) that there is a part of the country of origin where the applicant has no reason to fear persecution and runs no real risk of serious harm, and (2) that it could be reasonably expected of the applicant to stay in that part of the country (taking into account the general circumstances in the country and the personal circumstances of the applicant).
European Directive 115/2008 (the ‘Return Directive’) should be applied to the detention of asylum seekers – that is, with all the restrictions on the detention system, which is not to be used automatically but only in cases where there is considered to be a risk of absconding or a threat to society, and with an obligation to state the reasons for the detention – because otherwise there could be an unjustifiable disparity in the treatment of those who are to be returned (and who do not necessarily have to be detained) and asylum seekers who are already destined for return or expulsion (who should always be detained).
Requiring a political activist to live away from his home area in order to avoid persecution at the hands of his political opponents has never been considered a proper application of the internal relocation principle. Indeed, the pitfalls of requiring a person to act contrary to his normal behaviour in order to avoid persecution have been further emphasised by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) (see separate summary in this database).
Passive complicity in genocide includes a material element and an intentional element, as active complicity does.
This decision from the High National Court requested the Ministry of Interior to suspend the expulsion of Saharan citizens who lodged an appeal against the rejection of their asylum application. In the appeal, they submitted a precautionary (temporary) measure asking for the suspensive effect of the previous decision which would have resulted in their expulsion from Spanish territory.
According to the Qualification Directive, forced marriage, along with domestic violence and issues of faith, can be considered as persecution on a cumulative basis having regard to the situation in the country of origin.
This case involved a challenge to the transposition of the Procedures Directive into Irish domestic law which appeared to be barred by a special time limitation period of 14 days applicable to challenges to asylum/deportation decisions. The Court found that a Member State is entitled to apply a national limitation period even in respect of those cases where the Member State in question has failed properly to transpose the relevant Directive, provided that the limitation period complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The Court found that the strict 14 day time limit provided for in section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act, 2000, is not equivalent to the limitation period for judicial reviews in other broadly similar areas (generally 6 months) and is not effective because it is so short a time. In the circumstances, the limitation period could not be pleaded or relied upon against the applicants.
A residence permit granted on the grounds of subsidiary protection and an aliens passport granted under the previous Aliens Act (378/1991)31 § to a Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) national and his family members could not be withdrawn when the family moved from Finland without a prior inquiry into whether or not there were existing grounds for withdrawing the need for subsidiary protection in accordance with the Aliens Act (301/2004) 107 § 2nd clause.
This case examined the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with the European Convention on Human Rights regarding transfers to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found that there was a violation of Article 3 ECHR by the Greece Government because of the applicant’s conditions of detention, violation of Article 3 ECHR by Greece concerning the applicant’s living conditions in Greece, violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Greece because of the deficiencies in the asylum procedure followed in the applicant’s case and the risk of his expulsion to Afghanistan without any serious examination of the merits of his asylum application and without any access to an effective remedy. The Court also found in relation to Belgium that there was a violation of Article 3 by sending the applicant back to Greece and exposing him to risks linked to the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in that State, also held against Belgium a violation of Article 3 for sending him to Greece and exposing him to detention and living conditions there that were in breach of that ECHR article. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 ECHR taking in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR against Belgium.