Case summaries
A arrived in Finland via four transit countries using forged travel documents. When he/she was caught he/she applied for asylum in Finland. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that Article 31(3) of the Geneva Convention on Refugees prevented A from being persecuted for the crime of fraud.
This judgment overturned the decision of the Polish Refugee Board on examination of a manifestly unfounded application, on refusal to accord refugee status, provide subsidiary protection or grant a permit for tolerated stay, and on deportation from the Republic of Poland
In the proceedings, the foreigner stressed that he had left his country of origin as a child and currently has no family there, and that his entire family resides legally in Poland (they were granted a permit for tolerated stay in refugee proceedings). As the decision on refusal of protection is linked to the decision on deportation, refusal of protection would result in the Applicant being unable to see his family for many years. Therefore, in the Applicant’s opinion, the decision on deportation constituted interference in his family life, since it would result in him being separated from his family.
The Court found that the authority should properly examine and address the allegations made by the Applicant and thus consider the foreigner’s individual and family circumstances in the context of the possible application of Article 8 of the Convention, including the length of his stay in Poland, the possible obstacles to him living in his country of origin, and the likely effects on the Applicant’s family if the family was to be separated by the Applicant moving to another country.
Female genital mutilation constitutes an act of persecution relating to membership of a particular social group and, if it is established that such mutilation could specifically affect the Applicant, constitutes a reason for granting refugee status under Article 2 and subsequent articles of Legislative Decree No 251 of 19.11.2007, implementing Directive 2004/83/EC.
This inadmissibility decision concerned the transfer of Mrs. Hussein and her children to Italy from the Netherlands under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court found the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR as manifestly unfounded within the meaning of Article 35(3)(a) of the Convention. The Court found that though there were shortcomings in Italy it did not disclose systemic failures to provide support for asylum seekers there.
A Gambian asylum seeker’s account of approximately eight years’ imprisonment and torture there was not considered credible. The Immigration Service and the Helsinki Supreme Administrative Courtconsidered the application to be manifestly unfounded and the Supreme Administrative Court did not give leave to appeal on the matter. The UN Committee against Torture had, however, requested that the Applicant not be returned to his home country, The Gambia, until UNCAT had examined the complaint.
The ruling administrative body is obliged to try to make a decision within the time limit in international protection proceedings; an extension of the time limit must be duly justified and supported by the facts of the case. Absolute inactivity on the part of the ruling body cannot be justified by the instability of the situation in the country of origin or the complexity of the case.
In the present case certain formal conditions for dismissing the application through an accelerated procedure as defined in Article 54 of International Protection Act (ZMZ) were not taken into account. The Ministry of the Internal (MI) did not take a stance as regards the circumstances that the Applicant claimed as the grounds for leaving his country of origin and applying for international protection.
Once the Applicant states in his application for international protection that his human rights and fundamental freedoms would be violated if he was returned to the recipient country (in this case Bulgaria) in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, the Respondentmust verify whether any systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions constitute reasonable grounds for believing that the Applicant would be exposed to a real danger of inhuman and degrading treatment in the sense of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the Appellant against the High National Court’s judgment to uphold the Ministry of the Interior's decision to deny asylum. The Appellant is of Sahrawi origin. In the application he claims that one day the Moroccan police forces began to dismantle the Gdeim Izik (El Aaiun) camp, where the Applicant was living, violently suppressing the Sahrawi people who were there.
The appeal progressed because the denial was agreed via an accelerated procedure – similar to a “dismissal” – using Article 21.2o of Act 12/2009 (when someone alleges contradictory, implausible or insufficient infomation, or information that contradicts verified knowledge about the country of origin, clearly showing that their application is unfounded).
The Supreme Court maintained that although this is classed as a “refusal” (“denegación”), in actual fact it has the scant guarantees of “inadmissibility”: the application was rejected without having been fully analysed by the Interministerial Asylum and Refugee Commission or via an urgent procedure.
The judgment recognised the refugee status of a Guinean Applicant who had been the victim of a forced marriage and domestic violence. Various elements, in particular psychological evidence, explained lack of precision in her account.