Case summaries

This case concerned the test to be applied by the Minister as the decision-maker in applications for subsidiary protection. The Court held that it was permissible for the Minister to have regard to the reports and findings of other decision-makers in the asylum process (specifically the Refugee Appeals Tribunal). However, a particularly careful and thorough analysis will be required if the case for subsidiary protection is put on an entirely new basis which has never been considered at any stage of the process. In relation to state protection, the Court reiterated that the onus lies on an applicant to provide clear and convincing proof of a state’s inability to protect its citizens.

This case concerns the definition of the term “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive:

1. When defining the term “international or internal armed conflict” as set out in Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive one has to take into account international law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
2. An internal armed conflict within the meaning of Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive does not necessarily have to extend to the whole territory of a state.
3. An examination of the requirements for subsidiary protection under Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive is not precluded if the authorities have issued a general “suspension of deportation”.

The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.

The situation of the homosexuals which currently prevails in Iraq enables them to be  considered as forming a group whose members are likely to face acts of such gravity that they may amount to persecution in the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The concept of internal protection only applies if the asylum-seeker is able to reach the relevant region in a reasonable manner. In the light of Art 8 of the Qualification Directive an asylum-seeker can only be reasonably expected to stay in another part of his country of origin if he does not face risks in this region. The general situation in the region of internal protection and the applicant’s personal circumstances has to be taken into account. It is irrelevant for the granting of refugee status whether such risks likewise exist in the region of origin.

If a Member Sate has issued a visa that enables an applicant to enter its territory and that visa has expired less than six months previously, that Member State is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s asylum application as long as the applicant has not left the territory of the EU Member States. In this case, the visa issued by Slovenian authorities expired only 5 days before the asylum application was made in France. Slovenia was, therefore, the responsible Member State under Art 9(4) Dublin Regulation.

A female applicant from Syria belonging to a minority group was eligible for refugee protection based on the lack of fundamental rights and freedoms for the minority to which she belonged, in addition to her political activities.

Applying the guidance on assessing internal protection found in AH (Sudan) and Januzi (see separate summaries), it would be unduly harsh for an applicant to have to survive in the area of internal relocation through enforced prostitution even if this was widespread in the country of origin. An applicant’s individual vulnerability should be taken in to account in assessing internal protection.

The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.

Art 10.1 (b) of the Qualification Directive guarantees wide reaching protection of the freedom of religion. However, merely belonging to the Ahmadiyya religious community does not justify the granting of refugee status.