Case summaries
(1) be new, i.e. not have been subject to examination in an earlier procedure;
The situation which currently prevails in the region of Mosul, as well as in the whole territory of Iraq, can no longer be considered as a situation of armed conflict, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
The Family Reunification Directive does not make a distinction between whether a family relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State. An application for family reunification may not be refused where the sponsor, the resident within EU territory, has proved that he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who, given the level of his resources, will, nevertheless, be entitled to claim special assistance in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living costs, tax refunds, or income-support measures.
The Court found that a simple finding that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria because the population of the country is so large was devoid of any substantiation by reference to the facts of the case or to the circumstances of the applicant and of his family or to the nature of the threat of persecution which relocation would serve to avoid.
The Court indicated that that a finding that internal relocation will provide protection involves a two- fold consideration:
(a) First, the identification - if only in general terms - of an area or place in the country of origin which can reasonably be expected to be free of the particular source of persecution from which the applicant requires protection; and
(b) Secondly, an inquiry sufficient to confirm that a relocation there is feasible and reasonable to expect of the applicant (even if it involves hardship) having regard to the personal circumstances of the applicant and of his family.
No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.
The case concerned an appeal before the Supreme Court lodged by the Attorney General against the decision of the High National Court to grant refugee status. Status was granted to a Moroccan army deserter on the basis of a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. At issue on appeal was whether refugee status was granted based upon a fear of persecution resulting from the army desertion (which took place in Morocco), or due to the imputed political opinions that had arisen since his desertion (which arose in Spain): i.e. whether the applicant was a refugee sur place.
The case concerned an appeal submitted before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High National Court to refuse refugee status on the grounds that it was not established that the persecution alleged against the applicants was individually and personally targeted. The Supreme Court found that the High National Court erred in requiring a higher standard of proof than what was needed. The High National Court had required the applicant to demonstrate ‘conclusive evidence’ (“full evidence”) of persecution, however, a lower standard of evidence was required by the law.
The appellants argued that they were at risk of re-trafficking and would not find protection anywhere in Albania. The tribunal agreed, and laid down country guidance on the risks facing trafficked women and the absence of effective protection from these risks.
This case concerned the right to apply for asylum and seek an effective judicial remedy where the applicants had not reached Spanish territory (by land or sea). The Spanish Commission for Refugee Assistance (CEAR) lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against a decision of the High National Court. CEAR alleged that the applicants’ right to seek asylum and the right to effective judicial protection had been violated. The Supreme Court held that the applicants could not exercise those rights as they had not arrived on Spanish territory.
This case concerns exclusion from refugee status due to the alleged participation of a civilian in war crimes. It was found that an act committed by a civilian can be a war crime if this act is connected to an armed conflict. In the course of an internal armed conflict, war crimes can be directed not only against the civilian population but also against combatants of the opposing party.