Case summaries

This Case examines the refusal to grant refugee status to a Nepalese national. The Tribunal failed to provide clear, cogent reasoning for the decision. Documentation and explanations provided by the Applicant were not included in the decision. Unreasonable assumptions were made by the Tribunal including: as the Applicant’s wife, children and brother were safely residing in the country of origin, this inferred that the Applicant could do the same; since the applicant spent 6 years living safely in India, he could continue to live there safely. The High Court criticised the procedural approach by the Tribunal and the lack of coherent reasoning provided. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Tribunal’s decision.

An action for annulment before the Council for Alien Law Litigation was not an effective remedy. The Law of 15 March 2012 limiting the remedy against a decision rejecting an asylum application to an action for annulment when the Applicant came from a safe country of origin, whereas other applicants were able to seek a ‘full-remedy action’, breached the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution. The said Law was therefore repealed by the Constitutional Court.

The contested judgment is unconstitutional as it does not provide a clear way of assessing the jurisdiction of the third country when dealing with the application. It also reveals that the situation of the Applicant for international protection is unclear in the event that the application is rejected by the third country and the Applicant is not allowed to enter its territory, and shows that it is unclear as to what the Applicant can contest in this procedure.

An efficient legal system that would stop the extradition to a country in which the Applicant could be exposed to inhuman treatment has to have suspensive effect.

The ban on the introduction of new matters in appeal proceedings as stipulated in the Asylum Act does not violate the right of access to the courts contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as it represents a proportional restriction.

This case concerns a child asylum applicant who had his appeal against refusal of asylum considered after he had turned 18, and thus had become an adult. He complained that this breached Article 39 of the Procedures Directive (effective remedy).

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the Appellant against the High National Court’s judgment to uphold the Ministry of the Interior's decision to deny asylum. The Appellant is of Sahrawi origin. In the application he claims that one day the Moroccan police forces began to dismantle the Gdeim Izik (El Aaiun) camp, where the Applicant was living, violently suppressing the Sahrawi people who were there.

The appeal progressed because the denial was agreed via an accelerated procedure – similar to a “dismissal” – using Article 21.2o of Act 12/2009 (when someone alleges contradictory, implausible or insufficient infomation, or information that contradicts verified knowledge about the country of origin, clearly showing that their application is unfounded).

 The Supreme Court maintained that although this is classed as a “refusal” (“denegación”), in actual fact it has the scant guarantees of “inadmissibility”:  the application was rejected without having been fully analysed by the Interministerial Asylum and Refugee Commission or via an urgent procedure.

The legal proceedings relating to an appeal regarding the granting of international protection are a summary process that give the judge certain official powers. As a consequence, the judge should decide on the merits of an appeal even if the Applicant fails to attend the hearing.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

In this case the applicants argued unsuccessfully that the decision of the UK designated authority for determining asylum claims (the Secretary of State for the Home Department) regarding an applicant’s age should be accepted by other government bodies.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.