Case summaries

It is necessary to distinguish between the legal requirement to register a religious group under the law of the country of origin and enforcing such a registration with reasonable instruments permitted by the law, and the repressive actions of security units or other bodies of public authority towards members of a religious group that represent obvious excesses beyond the sphere of provisions permitted by law and which, at the same time, may, depending on particular circumstances, individually or on a cumulative basis, reach the intensity of persecution.

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.

The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.

Art 10.1 (b) of the Qualification Directive guarantees wide reaching protection of the freedom of religion. However, merely belonging to the Ahmadiyya religious community does not justify the granting of refugee status.

The applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against the High National Court’s decision to reject her asylum application. She claimed to have experienced persecution in Nigeria for religious reasons: her parents were killed in a religious confrontation between Muslims and Catholics. However, she did not explain how this fact was linked to a subsequent persecution. The Court held that the applicant was not a victim of religious persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, but that she had fled from a general conflict and a situation of political instability.

Refusal to perform compulsory basic military service cannot be considered as a reason for granting asylum, particularly if such a refusal is not connected with manifested political or religious beliefs.