Case summaries
The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.
The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.
The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.
The decision of the Administrative Court to refuse the applicant an oral hearing was overturned. The SAC held the Administrative Court did not show the Qualification Directive (which was implemented during the proceedings) had been applied and that the Administrative Court failed to take into consideration that as an asylum seeker the applicant had limited possibilities of supporting his claim by submitting written evidence only.
Serious reasons have to be established in order to apply the exclusion clause in Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, i.e. the material and intentional elements specific to the complicity.
The involvement in a State regular police force does not constitute, in itself, the expression of political opinions or the membership of a particular social group.
An Armenian opposition politician was considered a political refugee by the Migration Court of Appeal. Both the Migration Board and the Migration Court believed the applicant's political commitment and account of events. The Board considered, however, that the Armenian authorities' actions were not unreasonable and dismissed the application.
The Migration Court stated the fact that the applicant was not imprisoned for long periods did not imply that the arrests and ill-treatment that took place could be considered as acceptable measures by the authorities. Nor could the actions of the authorities be considered as reasonable or acceptable. The applicant was considered to be the victim of persecution that was rooted in his political belief.
The Court considered whether an application for international protection by an applicant of Russian nationality based on experiences of persecution in Lithuania (country of asylum) could be dismissed based on the reasoning that Lithuania is deemed to be a safe country of asylum. The Administrative Court held that the question of whether the applicants are in need of international protection based on the treatment they have received in their country of asylum, Lithuania, could not be examined in an asylum procedure in Lithuania.