Case summaries
To not give the applicant some additional time to submit documents that the authorities are already aware of which may be relevant for the asylum application is a violation of Art 4.1 of the Qualification Directive.
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) returned the case to the Administrative Court for reconsideration based on the applicants' change of circumstance (conversion to Christianity in Finland) which only became apparent during the appeal before the SAC.
A claim based on past persecution was rejected on the basis that it lacked credibility. A challenge to the decision of the Tribunal was successful on the basis that the decision did not contain any reasoned assessment of the prospective risk of future persecution if returned to Sudan. The High Court in its judgment cautioned against the use of case law as a source of country of origin information.
The Administrative Court did not consider credible the claim that the applicant’s conversion to Christianity had come to the attention of the Afghan authorities. The Court held that even if this information had reached the authorities, the applicant would not be at risk on return.
The High Court refused leave to apply for judicial review of a deportation order on the grounds that the decision of the Minister for Justice was reasonable.
Applying Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive, the Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) held that the mere finding that persecution has ceased in the country of origin, without showing that there are no good reasons to consider that such persecution will not be repeated, is insufficient to reject an application for asylum.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Tribunal must make a best interest of the child determination in considering an asylum appeal made by an unaccompanied minor. Further, that although the Secretary of State has a duty to trace the applicant’s family under the Reception Conditions Directive, this duty exists independently of the obligation to appropriately consider an asylum claim. Therefore the Secretary of State’s failure to act on the basis of the duty is not a ground on which an asylum appeal could be allowed.
Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.
A young couple (both minors) were eligible for subsidiary protection as they risked being the victims of honour-related violence in their country of origin. The Migration Court of Appeal concluded that in this particular case, it would be unreasonable to ask the applicants to have sought the protection of domestic authorities.
For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it. The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.
In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim. In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status. The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.