Case summaries

Membership of a political party is not required to establish persecution for reasons of political opinion.

Women who want to escape from a forced marriage, whose attitude is perceived by whole or part of the society of their country of origin as an infringement of the applicable customs and laws, and who therefore face a risk of persecution against which the authorities are unable or unwilling to provide protection, must be considered as members of a social group in the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention; when these conditions are not fulfilled, in particular when their behavior is not perceived as an infringement of the social order, these women nevertheless face the risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment and should therefore be granted subsidiary protection.

In the conditions which currently prevail in some rural areas in Eastern Turkey, the attitude of women of Kurdish origin who want to escape from a forced marriage is perceived by society and the authorities as an infringement of their customs, these women are therefore subjected to persecution committed with the assent of the population. Women who refuse forced marriage in these areas form a group whose members, by reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of Turkish society, are likely to face persecution against which the authorities are unable to provide protection.

The judgment defined a particular social group as a group of persons that objectively share common characteristics or who at least are perceived to do so by society. This characteristic is often of an innate and unchangeable nature or is otherwise fundamental to human identity, conscience or to the exercise of those particular persons’ human rights. This characteristic cannot be constituted by the risk of persecution itself.

Refusal to perform compulsory basic military service cannot be considered as a reason for granting asylum, particularly if such a refusal is not connected with manifested political or religious beliefs.

Belonging to a group of people without power or influence does not constitute a particular social group and therefore cannot be deemed a convention ground for persecution under the Refugee Convention. 

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide protection in respect of claims of conscientious objectors who feared imprisonment for their refusal to undertake military service where there is no alternative service offered in national law. This was the position even if that objection is to all forms of military service and is absolute. The right to conscientious objection was not yet protected in international human rights law and was yet to emerge as a principle of customary international law. A claim may succeed if the applicant would be required, in the course of military service, to conduct military action that breached the basic rules of human conduct or if the punishment they would receive for refusal to serve was discriminatory or disproportionate. Secondly, when assessing whether persecution was “for” a Convention reason the decision-maker should ask the question of “what was the real reason for the persecution?”. The decision-maker should not limit the enquiry to the persecutor’s motivation but should look for the effective reason or reasons.

When assessing an application for refugee status, what is important is whether the acts of persecution were carried out for the reasons identified in the Geneva Convention, and not whether or to what extent the victim of persecution can be identified with those reasons.

Fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention need not mean that persecution is certain or even probable. Recognition of refugee status is already justified where there are reasonable grounds for asserting the possibility of persecution. “Possibility” means that persecution may take place although it is neither certain nor probable, and the “reasonable grounds” requirement indicates the need to establish real and objective evidence of the risk of persecution. The plausibility of the threat is shown by the situation in the country of origin of the person applying for refugee status as well as that person’s experience to date.

In assessing claims based on political opinion, a broad approach needed to be adopted to ensure that the object and purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention was met.  Political opinion could be actual or imputed and had to be assessed in the context of the society that the applicant had fled.  Political opinion should not be restricted to issues relating to party politics nor, in the context of persecution non-state actors of persecution, was it helpful to identify those who were on the side of the forces of “law and order”.