Case summaries

The situation which currently prevails in the region of Mosul, as well as in the whole territory of Iraq, can no longer be considered as a situation of armed conflict, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

In the situation which currently prevails in Algeria, while homosexuality is in some ways tolerated by society, as long as it is not explicitly expressed by the behaviour or the clothes, individuals who openly manifest their homosexuality may nevertheless be subjected to intimidation in their social environment and by the security forces. In addition, legislation punishes homosexuals by a prison sentence and a fine.

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

This case concerned the interpretation of Article 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and the transposing Irish measure, which had added certain wording. The Court noted that the Directive left it open to Member States to introduce more favourable standards so long as they are compatible with the Directive. The Court held that the additional wording merely allowed a decision-maker in a case of compelling reasons, to determine eligibility for subsidiary protection as established without being obliged to be fully satisfied that previous serious harm inflicted upon an applicant runs a risk of being repeated.

This case concerned the criteria that needed to be fulfilled in order to establish the existence of an internal armed conflict. It was held that in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, at the time of this decision, a state of internal armed conflict was found to exist without an internal protection alternative. The applicant was therefore considered in need of protection.

The situation which prevails today in Mogadishu must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict. Its intensity is sufficient to consider that today the applicant faces a serious, direct and individual threat to his life or person, without being able to prevail himself of any protection.

In an application for subsidiary protection made after a failed refugee claim (and after a Deportation Order has been made), the Minister has a discretion to consider the application, which he can exercise if there is new information or altered circumstances. The absence of such means that that the Minister is entitled to refuse to entertain the application; there is no automatic right to make such an application at that late stage of proceedings.

This concerned whether the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) were required to make an assessment of subsidiary protection, and whether ORAC were obliged to examine country of origin information in every case. The court found that ORAC were not required to make a subsidiary protection assessment. The Court held that ORAC were not obliged to examine country of origin information in every case.

This case concerned an appeal against the refusal of international protection to an Imam from Kazakhstan who claimed persecution from state actors because of his religion. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Regional Court considered that persecution had not been established, and that the behaviour of the authorities had not been motivated by the applicant’s religious belief of “pure Islam” (this is a term that is used to distinguish themselves from other Muslims). However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and found that due to the specific circumstances of the applicant (an Imam) there was a risk of persecution. The Court also stated that refugee status can involve risk that is motivated by more than one reason, so long as one of those reasons is a persecution ground.

The security and humanitarian situation in Kabul does not meet the standards for a “situation of extreme risk” (extreme Gefahrenlage) for a returnee who grew up in Kabul. Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that a particular risk resulting from an armed conflict is substantiated.