Case summaries

The applicant, from Iran, claimed asylum based on his political opinion and religious belief (the applicant converted from Islam to Christianity on arrival in Finland). Refugee status was refused as the applicant failed to establish that he had come to the attention of the authorities through political activities or religious practices. A residence permit was granted based on subsidiary protection. The Court relied on the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, evidence of harassment of Christians in Iran and the overall deteriorating human rights situation.

The facilitated standard of proof of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive was deemed to be applicable both in the decision-making on the granting of refugee status and in the decision-making on the granting of subsidiary protection. The "reduced standard of probability" (of sufficient safety), as it has been developed by the German asylum jurisprudence, is no longer relevant for the examination of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In case of a concrete danger of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment the prohibition of deportation of Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act applies unconditionally, this includes deportations to signatory states of the European Court on Human Rights.

This case concerns the criteria for determining a serious individual threat and the necessary level of indiscriminate violence in an internal armed conflict.In order for Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive to apply, it is necessary to determine the level of indiscriminate violence in the territory of an internal armed conflict. When determining the necessary level of indiscriminate violence, not only acts which contravene international law, but any acts of violence which put life and limb of civilians at risk, have to be taken into account. In the context of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive, an internal nexus must exist between the serious harm (or threats thereof) suffered in the past, and the risk of future harm.

In this case the Court applied the CJEU’s decision in Elgafaji and the UK Court of Appeal’s decision in QD and AH (see separate summary on EDAL) and considered whether UK Immigration Tribunals had jurisdiction to consider Art 15 (c) in cases where removal directions had not been set. The specific issue concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence en route from Mogadishu to a safe area. It further considered and made important obiter comments on the ambit of Art 15 (c).

This case concerned the appropriate manner in which an application for subsidiary protection is to be decided where there may be at least an implicit claim of a “serious and individual threat” to the applicant by reason of indiscriminate violence. The Court found that Article 15(c) of the Directive does not impose a free-standing obligation on the Minister to investigate a possible armed conflict situation, it is for the applicant to make this claim and to make submissions and offer evidence establishing that he is from a place where there is a situation of international of internal armed conflict, and that he is at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence.

Vendetta constitutes a serious harm falling within the scope of subsidiary protection.

The decision of the asylum authority was annulled on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that an internal protection alternative existed. 

Subsidiary protection pursuant to Art. 14a(2)(b) of the Act on Asylum (serious harm consisting of inhuman or degrading treatment) may also be granted in so-called humanitarian cases. This goes beyond the scope of Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive; however, it is compatible with the directive. In order to grant subsidiary protection in so-called humanitarian cases, the factual circumstances need to reach the standard set out in the judgment of the ECtHR, D. v. the United Kingdom.

Subsidiary protection can be granted if on return to their country of origin an applicant would face a real risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The question at issue was whether the reasons for such ill-treatment related to Refugee Convention persecution grounds or not. All international protection statuses require an individual threat, which cannot be indirect as the risk assessment is a future oriented examination of the possibility of a threat, along with the applicant’s individual circumstances and the probabilities of risk.

The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) found the applicant not credible and therefore did not assess the risk of serious harm. Instead the OIN granted protection against refoulement. The Metropolitan Court ruled that the OIN was obliged to assess conditions for subsidiary protection and serious harm even if the applicant was not found credible.