Case summaries
A female applicant from Syria belonging to a minority group was eligible for refugee protection based on the lack of fundamental rights and freedoms for the minority to which she belonged, in addition to her political activities.
Applying the guidance on assessing internal protection found in AH (Sudan) and Januzi (see separate summaries), it would be unduly harsh for an applicant to have to survive in the area of internal relocation through enforced prostitution even if this was widespread in the country of origin. An applicant’s individual vulnerability should be taken in to account in assessing internal protection.
The case concerns the extent to which decision-makers should take into account a change of circumstances or situation in the country of origin.
Art 10.1 (b) of the Qualification Directive guarantees wide reaching protection of the freedom of religion. However, merely belonging to the Ahmadiyya religious community does not justify the granting of refugee status.
Gender may be a feature defining a social group, so women can be a particular social group.
Violence, beating, and bullying constitute persecution, even if these acts are committed by the local community or individual members thereof.
It is vital to determine whether the applicant obtained help from the state when she requested it or whether there was a genuine (and not just theoretical) opportunity to seek protection.
This case concerned state persecution. The CALL held that when the agents of persecution are national authorities, there is a strong presumption that protection within the country of origin is not accessible, as the authorities are able to pursue a person throughout the entire territory under their control.
This case concerned the argument that the decision of the Minister with regard to deciding whether to grant subsidiary protection must involve the same procedure as that which is applied in determining refugee status and that, in reviewing any such decision of the Minister, the courts must apply the same principles as apply to refugee determinations, rather than the principles that apply when reviewing the discretionary grant of humanitarian leave to remain or a decision as to non-refoulement. The Court held that nothing in the Procedures Directive required that the decision making process as to subsidiary protection should be the same as that for the refugee process, however if substantially new material was put forward in a subsidiary protection application it must be given a fair and reasoned consideration. The primary focus for deciding upon an application for subsidiary protection under the Qualifications Directive is on obtaining reliable and up to date country of origin information. It is not necessary for the Minister, in making such a decision, to engage in a dialogue with an applicant.
The Court considered the correct approach to sur place claims, having regard to Article 4 and 5 of the Qualification Directive. A difference exists between sur place activies pursued by a political dissident against his or her own government in the country where he or she is seeking asylum which may expose him or her to a risk of ill treatment or persecution and activities that were pursued solely with the motive of creating such a risk. However, the Directive should not be interpreted to prevent a claim based on opportunism. It requires an assessment of whether the authorities in the country of origin are likely to observe and record the claimant’s activities and recognises that those authorities may realise or be persuaded that the activity was insincere and, the fear of consequent ill-treatment not well-founded. But it does not prevent a claim made on such a basis.
This case concerned the exclusion from refugee status of a Taliban informer. The Supreme Administrative Court did not apply the exclusion clause in Art IF(b) (corresponding to § 87 paragraph 2 of the Finnish Aliens Act).The Court held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted in the narrowest possible manner.
New assessments and guidance from UNHCR regarding protection grounds and the possibility of internal protection are such "new circumstance" as referred to in Chapter 12 § 19 of the Aliens Act.
A recent UNHCR's report showing that the situation in Sri Lanka had significantly deteriorated for the group to which the applicant belonged was such a new factor and was likely to constitute a permanent obstacle to enforcement under Chapter 12. 1, 2 or 3 § and therefore a new assessment was granted.