Case summaries

The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.

The Helsinki Administrative Court held that returning a single mother with her two children to Malta to the conditions described and investigated, among others, in a UN Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Mission to Malta, and on the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee report on Maltese detention centres may cause the family to face inhuman treatment.

Applying Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive, the Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) held that the mere finding that persecution has ceased in the country of origin, without showing that there are no good reasons to consider that such persecution will not be repeated, is insufficient to reject an application for asylum.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Tribunal must make a best interest of the child determination in considering an asylum appeal made by an unaccompanied minor. Further, that although the Secretary of State has a duty to trace the applicant’s family under the Reception Conditions Directive, this duty exists independently of the obligation to appropriately consider an asylum claim. Therefore the Secretary of State’s failure to act on the basis of the duty is not a ground on which an asylum appeal could be allowed.  

Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.

The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.

Applying the guidance on assessing internal protection found in Januzi and AH (Sudan) (see separate summaries), an applicant’s “home area” must be established as a matter of fact. The applicant’s social and economic position may assume particular importance where the applicant’s “home area” is rural and the area of proposed internal relocation is urban.

The applicant based her claim for asylum on the threats and human rights violations arising as a result of her common-law husband’s political activities and the authorities’ suspicion of the applicant’s support of the opposition party. Refugee status was refused. The Administrative Court found that the applicant had failed to establish a risk of persecution based on her imputed political opinion. The Administrative Court held, that to return the applicant to her country of origin where she has experienced serious human rights violations, in the final stages of pregnancy or with a newborn child, without any social networks to fall back on, taken into account together, would form a real threat of serious harm suffering inhuman or degrading treatment as laid out in Art 88 of the Aliens Act.

A young couple (both minors) were eligible for subsidiary protection as they risked being the victims of honour-related violence in their country of origin. The Migration Court of Appeal concluded that in this particular case, it would be unreasonable to ask the applicants to have sought the protection of domestic authorities.

For the purposes of Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention a person is “of” or “has” a nationality where it is established that  he or she is already of that nationality or he or she is not of that nationality but is entitled to it.  The person should not be considered to hold a nationality if he or she only “may” be able to acquire it.

In assessing nationality in claims for refugee status, nationality is a matter for the State in question’s law, constitution and (to a limited extent) practice which should be proved by evidence and decided on, as a matter of fact, by the court deciding the protection claim.  In considering whether a person is a national or is entitled to a nationality of a second State, the person must use their “best efforts” to clarify their status.  The evidence of the attitude of a State towards a person who is seeking not to be removed to that State may be of very limited relevance.