Case summaries

This was a decision of the Polish Refugee Board of 29 August 2013 to uphold that part of the decision of the Head of the Polish Office for Foreigners which concerned refusal to accord refugee status and to overturn the remainder of the decision as well as to grant subsidiary protection.

The results of the linguistic analysis carried out by an external expert company should be assessed in the context of all the evidence gathered in the case, taking into account the principle of the benefit of doubt, also as regards establishing the country of origin.

Certain inaccuracies in the detail actually lend credibility to the testimony. This is evident particularly if one takes into account the fact that the foreign woman is a simple person without any education.

In the case of a Palestinian stateless asylum-seeker from Lebanon, the Court found the objection of the OIN (that was otherwise unverified by documents and based on which the decision to reject was made) to be unfounded, and recognised the Applicant as refugee. The Court emphasized that any procedure where the contents of the objection concerning a matter of national security are not subject to review, is arbitrary and seriously contradicts the principles of the rule of law as it makes the right to an effective remedy meaningless.

A man from Cameroon whom the UNHCR considered a refugee and granted permanent leave to remain in Sweden as a quota refugee was refused his application for refugee status and travel documents.

A bad situation in the country of origin does not constitute a sufficient intrinsic reason to accord refugee status or other forms of protection.

One cannot question the credibility of an applicant solely on the basis of a discrepancy between the information stated in the application and the information provided in subsequent stages of the proceedings.

The Respondent erred if, in a procedure on the extension of subsidiary protection, it failed to examine the threats to safety for repariated Afghan nationals. The Respondent,within the context of finding the facts, had completely failed to examine evidence of the existence of serious harm within the meaning of Section 2(f)(2) of the Asylum Act (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), and thus failed to address the question of whether, in the event of the Appellant returning (as a person who had left Afghanistan) to his country of origin, he would not also be at risk of this form of serious harm. The Respondent took no evidence in respect of this, which is contrary to the provisions of Section13a of the Asylum Act. Moreover, its actions were thus contrary to its own established practice, whereby, in (standard) proceedings on applications for international protection, it routinely ascertains the behaviour of state authorities in relation to unsuccessful asylum applicants or other groups of repatriated persons returning to their country of origin. 

In order for subsidiary protection to be provided, the law requires not just a fear but a well-founded fear. This means that a fear of persecution must be real and not fictional. If the genuine nature of an appellant’s fear were to be accepted on the basis of an outline provided to the Respondent in proceedings to extend subsidiary protection, it would lead to a situation where almost all nationals of countries in which any kind of conflict was taking place - even a local one not directly affecting most of the population - would have to be regarded, without further grounds for acceptance, as persons in respect of whom there were serious grounds for believing that they would be exposed to a real risk of serious harm in the event of returning to the country of origin.

This was a decision on appeal against detention under Articles 76(3) et seq of Law 3386/2005 and 30(2) of Law 3907/2011. It concerned an act to halt an asylum application, Non-attendance at the personal interview at the primary examination of the application was deemed to be tacit withdrawal of the application to be granted asylum. The Applicant was arrested due to the absence of legal documentation and decisions to detain and return were issued.  Mental illness associated with the return process was considered.

A judicial decision lifted the detention order so as to not worsen the health condition of the Applicant. Imposition of restrictions and a deadline for leaving Greece were discussed.

Dismissal of the Appellant’s claim that the findings of fact were incorrect beause the Respondent had failed to examine relevant grounds for assessing the  existence of serious harm from the perspectives listed under Section 2(f)(1) and (2) of the Asylum Act, and specifically the risk of execution.

As the Appellant did not claim, either during the administrative or the judicial proceedings (before the Regional Court), that criminal proeedings were under way against him in his country of origin, or that he faced the threat of execution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, the Respondent could not be criticised for approaching the hearing of evidence in relation to his claims concerning the bad security situation in his country of origin, and to that end had focused on assessing the security situation in the country of origin and had not dealt with the risk of execution in the country of origin.

This case concerns a child asylum applicant who had his appeal against refusal of asylum considered after he had turned 18, and thus had become an adult. He complained that this breached Article 39 of the Procedures Directive (effective remedy).

In the case of the first Applicant, the exceptional personal circumstances dictate round the clock highly qualified medical care, which is provided by health care institutions in Slovenia, while home care is provided by the second Applicant. If such a sick person were forced to leave the stable conditions in Slovenia and start living in a collective centre in BiH, the first Applicant could suffer inhuman or degrading treatment due to inappropriate health care, which would represent serious harm, which in turn justifies subsidiary protection in Slovenia.

In the event that the second Applicant was returned to the country of origin, she would be separated from the first Applicant (i.e. her family) contrary to the fundamental principle of family unity. Apart from this, in the event of returning to BiH or to a collective centre in BiH, it would be reasonable to believe that, as a young Roma female without a family and means for survival, she would also be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment due to the discrimination against the Roma population.