Case summaries

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

The situation which currently prevails in the region of Mosul, as well as in the whole territory of Iraq, can no longer be considered as a situation of armed conflict, within the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) of Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

The Family Reunification Directive does not make a distinction between whether a family relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State. An application for family reunification may not be refused where the sponsor, the resident within EU territory, has proved that he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who, given the level of his resources, will, nevertheless, be entitled to claim special assistance in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living costs, tax refunds, or income-support measures.

Under Article 2 ECHR there can be no extradition of an individual if a serious risk of the death penalty is established. An applicant’s psychological suffering due to the fear of execution by authorities violates Article 3.

It is not open to a Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another State which conflicts with its obligations under the Convention.

This case concerns the interpretation of Article 11 of the Qualification Directive when refugee status is deemed to have ceased to exist. The Court found this is when there has been change of circumstances which is significant and non-temporary and when there is no well-founded fear or other reason to risk being persecuted. States in assessing changes in circumstances must verify that the actors of protection have taken reasonable steps to prevent the persecution and that the person concerned has access to that protection. In making the assessment that there is no further risk the standard of probability used is the same that applied when refugee status was granted.

The Court found that a simple finding that the applicant could relocate within Nigeria because the population of the country is so large was devoid of any substantiation by reference to the facts of the case or to the circumstances of the applicant and of his family or to the nature of the threat of persecution which relocation would serve to avoid.

The Court indicated that that a finding that internal relocation will provide protection involves a two- fold consideration:

(a) First, the identification - if only in general terms - of an area or place in the country of origin which can reasonably be expected to be free of the particular source of persecution from which the applicant requires protection; and

(b) Secondly, an inquiry sufficient to confirm that a relocation there is feasible and reasonable to expect of the applicant (even if it involves hardship) having regard to the personal circumstances of the applicant and of his family.

No liability in damages in EU Law under Art 16(1)(b) of the Dublin Regulation arose from the failure to promptly examine an application for asylum where the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for the claim. The obligation in Art 13 of the Qualification Directive to grant refugee status to those entitled to it could not be considered a “civil right” protected by Art 6 of the ECHR in the absence of caselaw from the Strasbourg Court expressly recognising this.

The case concerned an appeal before the Supreme Court lodged by the Attorney General against the decision of the High National Court to grant refugee status. Status was granted to a Moroccan army deserter on the basis of a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion. At issue on appeal was whether refugee status was granted based upon a fear of persecution resulting from the army desertion (which took place in Morocco), or due to the imputed political opinions that had arisen since his desertion (which arose in Spain): i.e. whether the applicant was a refugee sur place.

The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it could not uphold the Regional Court’s decision regarding the Applicant’s credibility given the specific nature of the case, which concerned an unaccompanied foreign minor who  found himself in a completely different cultural and social environment, a factor which must be taken into account when assessing his application for asylum and his credibility.