Case summaries

This case considered whether or not a “family” could constitute a particular social group under the Refugee Convention. The applicant, whose family was implicated in a vendetta, had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the social group that is her family. It was held by the CALL that a family could constitute a particular social group. 

State protection should be assessed in the applicant’s home area, in the absence of an internal relocation alternative.  The Tribunal erred in finding that the fact that the applicant had been raped at her home on 3 separate occasions over a short period by government soldiers had the same effect on assessing future risk as if she had been raped by civilians. The soldiers appeared to act with impunity whereas that would not necessarily be the case for civilians. In assessing future risk past experience was central, as reflected in Art 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and by common sense. 

The conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were at the time of the decision not of such a character that it would prevent transferring asylum seekers according to the Dublin Regulation.

This case concerned the definition of an “internal armed conflict.” Relying on international humanitarian law and in particular on the Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the CALL defined  an “internal armed conflict” as continuous conflict between government authorities and organised armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The Call also found that a ceasefire did not necessarily mean that such a conflict had ended.

A major shift is currently taking place in the rules on burden of proof as regards the granting of international protection. It is up to the Commission and the courts to cooperate in checking the conditions that enable protection to be granted and they should obtain information concerning the country of origin by official means.

The fact that a party to proceedings has an unknown residence must always be proven in a credible manner, as must the exact determination of an address of residence in the territory of the Slovak Republic, and this obligation rests with the Court, which must exhaust all possibilities in determining whether the participant’s address really is unknown, or whether his address is other than the one known to the Court. Everyone has the right to have their case heard in court in their presence and to be able to comment on all of the evidence (Article 38(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Article 48(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic).

This case concerned an appeal against the refusal of international protection to an Imam from Kazakhstan who claimed persecution from state actors because of his religion. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Regional Court considered that persecution had not been established, and that the behaviour of the authorities had not been motivated by the applicant’s religious belief of “pure Islam” (this is a term that is used to distinguish themselves from other Muslims). However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and found that due to the specific circumstances of the applicant (an Imam) there was a risk of persecution. The Court also stated that refugee status can involve risk that is motivated by more than one reason, so long as one of those reasons is a persecution ground.

Failure to receive basic services does not represent a reduction within the meaning of Art 16 Reception Conditions Directive. The Reception Conditions Directive does not standardise decision deadlines with regard to applications for the granting of basic services.

Extradition to Iran of an Iranian citizen. The wanted person was a political refugee who had been recognised by the UN High Commission for Refugees. The Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) rejected the extradition request because of his status and because of the appeal he lodged under the provisions of Article 5 (2) of Presidential Decree 8/2008.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.