Case summaries

The Applicant had been forced to leave the UNRWA’s area of operations. The facts that had led to his departure from Lebanon justified ending his exclusion from the application of Article 1D of the Geneva Convention.

Rather than dismissing the application, the Court recognised the subsidiary protection status of the Applicant, as his/her return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (inhuman, degrading treatment or indiscriminate violence).

After the case has been referred back to the Respondent, it will examine whether the Appellant only formally converted to Christianity and how he might prove that he was also putting his conversion into practice through his life and actions as a result of which his return to Iran would be excluded. In taking evidence on this question, the Respondent must cooperate with persons and bodies that might provide relevant information concerning the Appellant – for example, clergymen, Christian associations, churches and the like.

Applicant M was a citizen of Algeria who applied for a residence document in Finland on grounds of family relations. He/she was married to a sponsor called L and they had a joint minor child. L had another child from a previous marriage. A prerequisite for M to be granted a residence document was for him/her to have sufficient income, which he/she did not have. There was also the question of whether denying a residence document breached the Union citizen’s rights under Article 20 of the TFEU. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that denying a residence document did not breach the Unio citizen’s rights. In addition, there were no factors which would support deviating from the means of support prerequisite as stated in the law.

A foreigner shall cease to be eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances which led to the granting of subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that protection is no longer required. The relevant provision refers to two separate reasons that justify revoking subsidiary protection. The first is that the circumstances which led to the granting of such protection have ceased to exist. The second is that those circumstances have changed, although the change of circumstances must be of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the foreigner no longer faces a real risk of serious harm.

Subsidiary protection cannot establish a right that is comparable to, for instance, the right to obtain permission for temporary stay or indefinite leave to remain.

The grounds for extending a deadline for departure can exist either within the country or abroad or grounds which otherwise hinder a departure within the deadline. In addition, problems which typically affect former asylum seekers, namely long absence from the country of origin and circumstances such as disappearance of their social network following an absence of many years, are to be considered as special circumstances which make it necessary to extend the deadline for departure.

Although voluntary departure is an absolute requirement for the extension of the deadline for departure, the intention to submit an application for leave to remain does not in itself represent an obstacle. Rather, a judgment is required in each individual case.

A person in detention pending deportation has a fundamental right to receive visitors -including visits from journalists -and inhibiting this visiting right for the person in detention can be challenged by way of appeal to the Independent Administrative Senate. A journalist, on the other hand, who has been refused a visit to someone in deportation detention, does not have a right of appeal, amongst other things, because the information which could be provided by the person in deportation detentionis not publicly accessible and there is thus no state obligation under Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to facilitate access to this information by granting a visit to the person in deportation detention.

This case concerned an application for a licence for a civil marriage with a Greek citizen where there was an inability to provide a certificate of being unmarried or a birth certificate because of disrupted relationship with homeland and in the context of the submission of a sworn statement regarding the absence of any impediment to marriage. The case considered the balance between the safeguards of family law and a State's obligation to protect the fundamental rights of refugees. Under the principle of proportionality, the private and family life of the individual is inviolable, bearing in mind that the lack of evidence of being unmarried should not prevent the him from being granted a licence to enter into a civil marriage with his partner, the mother of their two minor children which he has already voluntarily recognised. It is possible to substitute in concreto the said evidence with a simple sworn statement and, therefore, the Applicant does satisfy the legal requirements for the granting of a marriage licence.

It is an administrative appeal brought before the High National Court against the Ministry of the Interior’s decision to deny an examination of the application for international protection by a claimant of Pakistani nationality, on the basis that Germany is responsible for the examination in accord with EU Regulation 343/2003 of 18th February (Dublin Regulation).

The High National Court had not yet evaluated the basis of the application for international protection because, before doing so, an obstacle to the proceedings arose:this concerned the determination of the country responsible for examining the application and, in particular, the breach of the legal time period for the transfer of this responsibility (a maximum period of 6 months for the transfer).

Owing to a violation of the right to respect for private life, the expulsion of the Applicants was declared permanently unlawful. On the grounds of Art 8 of the ECHR, the Asylum Court emphasised the significance of illnesses and their treatment (outside the context of Art 3 of the ECHR) in the host country and in doing so also referred to the disadvantagouss effects of the discontinuation of  psychotherapy by the applicant mother on the child. With reference to the best interest of the child, the Asylum Court made it clear that, in the case of children, roots to the host country could be developed more quickly than for adults, in particular if especially formative parts of childhood and young adolescence were spent in the host country.