Case summaries

The risk of arranged marriage is widespread in Afghanistan, particularly for underage girls, which means that it may constitute grounds for refugee status for women.  
In the examination of Article 8 of Directive 2004/83/EC, it is important to take into account the fact that family members may only return together with their children and spouses on the grounds of the protection of marriage and family. 

Female genital mutilation constitutes an act of persecution relating to membership of a particular social group and, if it is established that such mutilation could specifically affect the  Applicant, constitutes a reason for granting refugee status under Article 2 and subsequent articles of Legislative Decree No 251 of 19.11.2007, implementing Directive 2004/83/EC.

The judgment recognised the refugee status of a Guinean Applicant who had been the victim of a forced marriage and domestic violence. Various elements, in particular psychological evidence, explained lack of precision in her account.

The Applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan minor, stated that he had left his home country owing to his abduction and the threat of sexual abuse by the local ruler. The right to a decision by the statutory judge was violated by the fact that the decision on the application for international protection was made by a court panel consisting of two judges, one male and one female.

Refugee status was recognised for a transgender woman from Pakistan because discrimination for reasons relevant to asylum as well as involuntary prostitution to earn a living are sufficiently serious to represent persecution within the meaning of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

Neither the Applicant, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the decision, nor her parents had submitted reasons for persecution specifically relevant to the Applicant in the proceedings at the court of first instance or in the appeal. Despite this, the Asylum Court reached the conclusion – amongst other things after a personal hearing of the Applicant – that the Applicant would be persecuted directly by the state or privately in Afghanistan owing to her membership of a particular social group and the religious-political attitude to which she would be subjected. In doing so the Asylum Court applied child specific considerations.

In addition, the Court stated that group persecution was to be assumed with regard to Afghan women.

The CALL held that the fact the Applicant had already suffered very severe genital mutilation (type III – infibulation) was a serious indicator of a well-founded fear of persecution due to her membership of a particular social group. 

Three Somali girls were considered to have a well-founded fear of being forced to undergo female genital mutilation and therefore gender-based persecution, which entitled them to be granted refugee status.

This was the substantive hearing of a case in which leave to seek judicial review of a subsidiary protection decision was granted on the basis that (a) it was arguably erroneous to conclude that because State protection was available in respect of the actions of non-State agents who inflicted serious injury on the Applicant, the said injury could not amount to "serious harm;" and (b) The decision failed to consider whether, arising out of the previous harm suffered by the Applicant, compelling reasons existed to warrant a determination that she was eligible for subsidiary protection. The Applicant was successful on both grounds and the decision was quashed by the Court.